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WHAT CLIMATE CHANGE CAN DO ABOUT TORT LAW 
BY 
DOUGLAS A. KYSAR* 
To date, scholars exploring the connection between climate 
change and tort law have tended to ask what the latter can do about the 
former. With a few notable exceptions, they have answered, “Not 
much.” This Article first reviews a series of doctrinal hurdles facing 
climate change plaintiffs and concludes that the pessimism of legal 
scholars is justified. The Article then poses an inverse and previously 
unexplored question: what can climate change do about tort law? As it 
turns out, the answer is, “Quite a bit.” By forcing courts to confront 
questions of harm, causation, and responsibility that lie at the frontiers 
of science and ethics, climate change lawsuits hold potential to move 
the bar for what counts as exotic in the domain of tort. Radical though 
it may seem, such a recalibration should be welcomed: just as the 
administrative state is being forced to adapt to grapple with the global, 
complex, uncertain, and potentially catastrophic nature of twenty-first 
century threats to social welfare, the tort system also must shift in 
order to serve its role as the administrative state’s traditional and 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Climate change is coming to the common law. Plaintiffs in several cases 
have pressed tort claims against carefully composed groups of greenhouse 
gas emitting defendants, seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief to 
lessen the threat and financial burden of climate change’s harmful impacts.1 
Surprisingly, not all of these cases have been dead on arrival. Although 
malleable and expedient doctrines such as standing, political question, and 
preemption might be invoked to justify dismissal, at least one climate 
change tort suit instead was poised to proceed to the merits, at least until 
the Supreme Court granted review of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ 
refusal to dismiss the suit on justiciability grounds.2 Depending on the 
outcome of that appeal, the question of whether greenhouse gas emissions 
constitute an actionable tort under federal or state law, much discussed in 
law journals,3 may eventually receive full judicial airing. 
 
 1 See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009) 
(granting defendants’ motion to dismiss); California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 
2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (granting defendants’ motion to dismiss); Comer v. 
Murphy Oil USA, No. 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW, 2007 WL 6942285 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007) 
(granting defendants’ motion to dismiss), rev’d, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), panel opinion 
vacated en banc, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 
2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (granting defendants’ motion to dismiss), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 
2009), cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174). For discussion of the 
justiciability aspects of these suits, see Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: 
Limited Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm (2010) (working paper) (on file with author). 
 2 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 265 (granting defendants’ motion to dismiss), 
vacated, 582 F.3d 309, cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174).  
 3 See Randall S. Abate, Automobile Emissions and Climate Change Impacts: Employing 
Public Nuisance Doctrine as Part of a “Global Warming Solution” in California, 40 CONN. L. REV. 
591 (2008); Myles Allen et al., Scientific Challenges in the Attribution of Harm to Human 
Influence on Climate, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1353 (2007); David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-
So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2003); Shi-Ling 
Hsu, A Realistic Evaluation of Climate Change Litigation Through the Lens of a Hypothetical 
Lawsuit, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 701 (2008); David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in the Air: 
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Assuming that the Supreme Court does not act to prevent climate 
change tort suits from reaching the merits altogether, courts in all likelihood 
will agree with commentators that nuisance and other traditional tort 
theories are overwhelmed by the magnitude and the complexity of the 
climate change conundrum.4 Built as it is on a paradigm of harm in which A 
wrongfully, directly, and exclusively injures B, tort law seems fundamentally 
 
The Duty of Care in Climate Change Litigation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1741 (2007); Timothy D. 
Lytton, Using Tort Litigation to Enhance Regulatory Policy Making: Evaluating Climate-Change 
Litigation in Light of Lessons from Gun-Industry and Clergy-Sexual-Abuse Lawsuits, 86 TEX. L. 
REV. 1837 (2008); Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Future Generations: Does Massachusetts v. 
EPA Open Standing for Generations to Come?, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2009); Bradford C. 
Mank, Standing and Global Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 ENVTL. L. 1 (2005); 
James R. May, Climate Change, Constitutional Consignment, and the Political Question 
Doctrine, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 919 (2008); Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public 
Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293 (2005); Matthew F. Pawa & Benjamin A. Krass, Global 
Warming as a Public Nuisance: Connecticut v. American Electric Power, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. 
REV. 407 (2005); Christopher R. Reeves, Climate Change on Trial: Making the Case for 
Causation, 32 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 495 (2009); Amelia Thorpe, Tort-Based Climate Change 
Litigation and the Political Question Doctrine, 24 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 79 (2008); Jonathan 
Zasloff, The Judicial Carbon Tax: Reconstructing Public Nuisance and Climate Change, 55 
UCLA L. REV. 1827 (2008); Blake R. Bertagna, Comment, “Standing” Up for the Environment: 
The Ability of Plaintiffs to Establish Legal Standing to Redress Injuries Caused by Global 
Warming, 2006 BYU L. REV. 415 (2006); Erin Casper Borissov, Note, Global Warming: A 
Questionable Use of the Political Question Doctrine, 41 IND. L. REV. 415 (2008); Nigel Cooney, 
Note, Without a Leg to Stand on: The Merger of Article III Standing and Merits in Environmental 
Cases, 23 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 175 (2007); James R. Drabick, Note, “Private” Public Nuisance 
and Climate Change: Working Within, and Around, the Special Injury Rule, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL. 
L. REV. 503 (2005); Daniel J. Grimm, Note, Global Warming and Market Share Liability: A 
Proposed Model for Allocating Tort Damages Among CO2 Producers, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 209 
(2007); Benjamin P. Harper, Note, Climate Change Litigation: The Federal Common Law of 
Interstate Nuisance and Federalism Concerns, 40 GA. L. REV. 661 (2006); Shawn M. LaTourette, 
Note, Global Climate Change: A Political Question?, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 219 (2008); Kirk B. Maag, 
Note, Climate Change Litigation: Drawing Lines to Avoid Strict, Joint, and Several Liability, 98 
GEO. L.J. 185 (2009); Christopher L. Muehlberger, Comment, One Man’s Conjecture is Another 
Man’s Concrete: Applying the “Injury-in-Fact” Standing Requirement to Global Warming, 76 
UMKC L. REV. 177 (2007); Sarah Olinger, Comment, Filling the Void in an Otherwise Occupied 
Field: Using Federal Common Law to Regulate Carbon Dioxide in the Absence of a Preemptive 
Statute, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 237 (2007); Joseph M. Stancati, Note, Victims of Climate Change 
and Their Standing to Sue: Why the Northern District of California Got it Right, 38 CASE W. RES. 
J. INT’L L. 687 (2006–2007); Myles R. Allen & Richard Lord, The Blame Game: Who Will Pay for 
the Damaging Consequences of Climate Change?, 432 NATURE 551 (2004); Matthew F. Pawa, 
Global Warming: The Ultimate Public Nuisance, 39 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10230 
(2009); David A. Dana, The Mismatch Between Public Nuisance Law and Global Warming (Nw. 
U. Pub. L. & Legal Series, Working Paper No. 08-16, L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 08-05, May 6, 
2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1129838. For an 
especially early and thoughtful contribution, see Eduardo M. Peñalver, Acts of God or Toxic 
Torts? Applying Tort Principles to the Problem of Climate Change, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 563 
(1998). For exploration of climate change torts as part of an insightful analysis of efficiency-
based and justice-based approaches to global climate change policy, see Amy Sinden, Allocating 
the Costs of the Climate Crisis: Efficiency Versus Justice, 85 WASH. L. REV. 293, 323–39 (2010). 
For a collection of recent essays exploring the implications of climate change litigation in a 
variety of contexts both tort and non-tort, see ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, 
AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES (William C.G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky eds., 2009). 
 4 Harper, supra note 3, at 698. 
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ill-equipped to address the causes and impacts of climate change: diffuse 
and disparate in origin, lagged and latticed in effect, anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions represent the paradigmatic anti-tort, a collective 
action problem so pervasive and so complicated as to render at once both all 
of us and none of us responsible. Thus, courts will have ample reason—not 
to mention doctrinal weaponry—to prevent climate change tort suits from 
reaching a jury. To be sure, tort law may play a positive role in helping to 
characterize the harms imposed by climate change, in singling out avenues 
for efficaciously reducing those harms, and in rattling the cages of the 
political branches that are best situated to pursue those avenues.5 As 
Professor J.B. Ruhl has emphasized, tort law may also play a significant role 
in helping to establish standards of foresight and responsibility with respect 
to climate change adaptation needs.6 Beyond such effects, however, tort law 
is unlikely to play a substantial role in the ultimate effort to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
But what might climate change suits do for tort law? That is, rather than 
serving to address the impacts of climate change, might tort law itself be 
impacted by climate change? This Article answers “yes.” Just as earlier 
periods of unprecedented injury and loss of life contributed to significant 
changes in American tort doctrine and practice,7 an influx of climate change 
claims may force a reevaluation of the existing system for compensating and 
deterring harm. Most significantly, the bar for exoticism in tort may shift as 
courts are confronted by climate-related claims. Various suits that have 
frustrated judges because of their scale, scientific complexity, and 
widespread policy implications—such as claims involving toxic and 
environmental harm, tobacco and handgun marketing, or slavery and 
Holocaust reparations—may come to seem less daunting and intractable 
when juxtaposed against “the mother of all collective action problems.”8 
Current debate over whether courts are engaging in “regulation through 
litigation”9 may come to appear miscast in the face of suits that raise at once 
both an ordinary pollution nuisance and a challenge to the very foundations 
 
 5 See Ewing & Kysar, supra note 1, at 6. 
 6 See J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of 
Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 401 (2010). 
 7 See generally JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC 4 (2004) (“This book is about 
the American industrial-accident crisis and the transformations it occasioned in American law. 
Beginning soon after the Civil War, industrial accidents gave rise to a series of large-scale 
experiments in social, industrial, and legal reform. Judges and juries developed an entire field of 
law known as the law of torts.”); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 516–23 
(3d ed. 2005) (discussing workers’ compensation and the “liability explosion”). 
 8 Sarah Krakoff, Fragmentation, Morality, and the Law of Global Warming 28 (Univ. of 
Colo. Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 07-10, 2007), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=976049. 
 9 For critical overviews, see AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CTR. FOR REGULATORY STUDIES, 
REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION (W. Kip Viscusi, ed., 2002); ANDREW P. MORRISS, BRUCE 
YANDLE, & ANDREW DORCHAK, REGULATION BY LITIGATION (2009). For the origination of the term, 
see Robert B. Reich, Regulation Is Out, Litigation Is In, USA TODAY, Feb. 11, 1999, at 15A. 
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of modern industrial life.10 At long last, courts and commentators may come 
to view tort claims in degrees of polycentricity, rather than in crude binary 
terms of conventional civil disputes, on the one hand, and political or 
regulatory matters, on the other.11  
Should these developments occur, they will be salutary, as they will 
help tort law to continue its role as backdrop and partner to environmental, 
health, and safety regulation.12 Gradually and unevenly, the administrative 
state is evolving in response to the complex, uncertain, and potentially 
catastrophic nature of twenty-first century threats to social welfare. 
Problems such as climate change, terrorism, infectious disease outbreaks, 
and financial market instability resist figuration within conventional 
regulatory frameworks, not least because their drivers and impacts span the 
globe and fall under multiple agency mandates. Even garden variety 
regulatory tasks such as ecosystem management and pharmaceutical 
regulation increasingly are being seen to require new modes of governance, 
ones built on an understanding of risk regulation as a continual process of 
experimentation, monitoring, and adjustment in light of ever-present 
prospects of unpleasant surprise.13 Under this “new governance” 
framework,14 regulatory targets are seen to be embedded within intricate 
 
 10 See Eric A. Posner, Tobacco Regulation or Litigation?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1141, 1155 (2003) 
(“Th[e] claim that there is a special class of troubling ‘regulation by litigation’ cases will strike 
lawyers as odd. Tort law is a form of regulation, and always has been. . . . [O]ne suspects that 
Viscusi does not understand this basic point.”) (reviewing W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS: 
A POSTMORTEM ON THE TOBACCO DEAL (2002)). 
 11 Cf. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394–404 
(1978) (describing the concept of a “polycentric” task).  
 12 See Connecticut v. Am. Electric Power, 582 F.3d 309, 325 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[N]uisance 
principles contribute heavily to the doctrinal template that underbraces [environmental] 
statutes . . . .” (quoting Me. People’s Alliance & Natural Res. Def. Council v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 
471 F.3d 277, 286 (1st Cir. 2006))); WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
§ 2.1, at 100 (1977) (“The deepest doctrinal roots of modern environmental law are found in 
principles of nuisance. . . . Nuisance actions have involved pollution of all physical media—air, 
water, land—by a wide variety of means. . . . Nuisance actions have challenged virtually every 
major industrial and municipal activity which is today the subject of comprehensive environmental 
regulation . . . . Nuisance theory and case law is the common law backbone of modern 
environmental and energy law.”); Matthew F. Pawa & Benjamin A. Krass, Behind the Curve: The 
National Media’s Reporting on Global Warming, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 485, 487–88 (2006) 
(“Because of its flexibility, common law nuisance continues to play a vital role in 
complementing statutory environmental enforcement tools . . . .”); J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their 
Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 315 (2000) (“It has often 
been said that the statutory form of modern environmental law is built on the backbone of the 
common law of nuisance.”). 
 13 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty 
Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943, 952 (2003) (noting that new 
governance principles can be used to approach ecosystem management issues); CATHERINE 
LYALL, ECON. & SOC. RESEARCH COUNCIL, GENOMICS NETWORK, BRIEFING NO. 9, GOVERNING 
GENOMICS: NEW GOVERNANCE TOOLS FOR NEW TECHNOLOGIES?, at 1–4, available at 
http://www.genomicsnetwork.ac.uk/media/Governing%20Genomics.pdf (noting how new 
governance is altering the way in which pharmaceutical regulation occurs). 
 14 The “new governance” literature is vast. For overviews, see Scott Burris, Michael Kempa, & 
Clifford Shearing, Changes in Governance: A Cross-Disciplinary Review of Current Scholarship, 41 
AKRON L. REV. 1 (2008), and Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of 
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systems that defy precise prediction and control; rapidly evolving, globally 
interconnected, and wickedly complex, such systems do not yield to 
straightforward command-and-control regulation or other familiar 
lawmaking forms.15 Instead, governance only emerges from the 
decentralized, overlapping, and continually evolving interventions of public 
and private actors, each operating at different levels and from different 
spheres of authority, utilizing a range of policy tools both hard and soft, and 
representing diverse interests and stakeholder groups. Rather than the 
hierarchical and near complete authority of the state, power within these 
systems is widely distributed and decidedly partial. Indeed, even the state 
itself increasingly is being seen as a complex tissue of actors and networks, 
rather than a unified or even federally-stratified sovereign. 
As regulatory law moves in response to these unprecedented challenges 
to the promotion of welfare (and new understandings of old challenges), tort 
law must move along with it in order to continue to serve as the 
administrative state’s necessary backdrop. Given its classical liberal origins 
and its limited adjudicatory framework, tort law will always lag regulatory 
law in its embrace of a “systems view” of risk and harm. Nevertheless, the 
era of climate change will make certain trappings of classical liberalism—
such as the presumed atomicity of private actors or the purely mechanistic 
depiction of causation—increasingly difficult to maintain. Just as railroad 
and workplace carnage forced recognition of new forms of risk in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century,16 just as automobile and product-caused 
accidents illuminated extended chains of responsibility in the twentieth 
century,17 climate change will challenge prevailing conceptions of 
wrongdoing in the twenty-first century. When even the most dystopian 
climate change scenario—such as the complete erasure of territorial 
 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004). For helpful applications 
to climate change, see Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: 
Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153 (2009), and Kelly Levin et 
al., Playing it Forward: Path Dependency, Progressive Incrementalism, and the “Super Wicked” 
Problem of Global Climate Change (July 7, 2007) (paper prepared for delivery to the Int’l Studies 
Ass’n Convention Chicago, Ill., Feb. 28–Mar. 3, 2007), available at http://environment.yale.edu/ 
uploads/publications/2007levinbernsteincashoreauld Wicked-Problems.pdf. For an insightful 
application to environmental law more generally, see Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental 
Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (1995).  
 15 See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 
98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 270 (1998) (“[O]ur national affairs are too complex, diverse, and volatile 
to be governed by lapidary expressions of the public will—laws of Congress, administrative 
rules, judicial judgments—that indicate precisely how to dispose of most of the cases to which 
they will eventually be applied.”). 
 16 Safety Appliance Acts, ch. 196, § 8, 27 Stat. 531, 532 (1893) (codified as amended at 49 
U.S.C. § 20304 (2006)). The act imposed liability on railroad carriers for injury or death of 
workers if the carrier did not meet its statutory obligations; previously, such liability was 
assumed by the workers. See Kohn v. McNulta, 147 U.S. 238, 240–41 (1893).  
 17 E.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1051, 1053 (N.Y. 1916) (holding that 
“[i]f the nature of a [car] is such that it is reasonably certain to place and limb in peril when 
negligently made, it is then a thing of danger,” and thus manufacturers are liable for negligence 
beyond the original owner). 
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homeland for distinct and long-lived human civilizations,18 or the rendering 
of vast swaths of currently inhabited land unsuitable for human existence 
due to the threat of hyperthermia19—fails to register as a responsibility of 
any actor anywhere, our principles of causal and moral attribution need to 
be rethought. As with earlier periods of societal evolution in response to 
suffering that is uncompensated, undeterred, and unrationalized, tort law 
will not be exempt from this necessity of reevaluation. Put bluntly, tort law 
will be forced to adapt or perish, much like life itself in a warming world. 
Part II of this Article provides an overview of challenges facing 
climate change plaintiffs under prevailing tort doctrines. It begins by 
noting the odd alignment of legal economists and plaintiffs’ lawyers as two 
groups that both have attempted to squeeze the climate change problem 
into existing paradigms for understanding and resolving pollution disputes. 
It then challenges their efforts by detailing a variety of ways in which the 
problem of climate change causes existing paradigms to buckle and shake. 
After concluding that climate change tort suits are unlikely to prevail on 
the merits, Part III turns the lens around to ask what climate change 
litigation might nonetheless do for tort law itself. It argues that judges, 
having engaged up close with the extraordinary accumulation of minor, 
diffuse activities into a global environmental problem of potentially 
biblical magnitude, may find themselves willing to step farther outside of 
the classical liberal tort paradigm in non-climate change cases—yet 
another surprising and dramatic consequence of humanity’s most dramatic 
experiment with the natural world. 
 
 18 Nobuo Mimura et al., Small Islands, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 690 (2007) (“Owing to their 
high vulnerability and low adaptive capacity, small islands have legitimate concerns about their 
future . . . .”); Jon Barnett & W. Neil Adger, Climate Dangers and Atoll Countries, 61 CLIMATIC 
CHANGE 321, 327 (2003) (due to potential impacts of climate change, “the physical basis of 
national sovereignty of the atoll countries . . . is at risk”). But see Arthur P. Webb & Paul S. 
Kench, The Dynamic Response of Reef Islands to Sea-Level Rise: Evidence from Multi-Decadal 
Analysis of Island Change in the Central Pacific, 72 GLOBAL & PLANETARY CHANGE 234, 245 
(2010) (concluding that, to date, there is “no evidence of large-scale reduction in island area” for 
Pacific atolls “despite the upward trend in sea level”). 
 19 See Steven C. Sherwood & Matthew Huber, An Adaptability Limit to Climate Change Due 
to Heat Stress, 107 PROC. NAT. ACAD. SCI. 9552, 9554 (2010) (“We conclude that a global-mean 
warming of roughly 7°C would create small zones where metabolic heat dissipation would for 
the first time become impossible, calling into question their suitability for human habitation. A 
warming of 11–12°C would expand these zones to encompass most of today’s human 
population.”). Influential economic models within climate change policy often assume 
implausible adaptive capacity by human populations to a warming world, thereby keeping down 
climate change damage estimates. William Nordhaus’s DICE model, for instance, estimates that 
only one half of world gross domestic product would be lost at a temperature increase of 19°C, 
an increase far above the human body’s capacity to dissipate heat and avoid hyperthermia. See 
Frank Ackerman, Elizabeth A. Stanton & Ramón Bueno, Fat Tails, Exponents, Extreme 
Uncertainty: Simulating Catastrophe in DICE, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1657, 1660 (2010). 
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II. CLIMATE CHANGE AS THE ANTI-TORT 
Given the connection between legal economic reasoning and tort 
reform initiatives over the past three decades,20 economists and plaintiffs’ 
lawyers make for unlikely bedfellows. Yet the two groups do come together 
in their apparent belief that climate change is not a paradigm-shifting 
phenomenon. To most environmental economists, the fact that 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are driving atmospheric and 
oceanic changes of geologically unprecedented scale does not fundamentally 
alter their framework for evaluating environmental policy issues. On the 
conventional economic account, greenhouse gas emissions are just another 
Pigouvian negative externality,21 and the appropriate policy response is 
simply to “get the incentives right” so that emitters undertake activities with 
a disciplined awareness of external impacts. Such a policy response might 
take the form of an emissions tax, which ideally is set equal to the marginal 
environmental damage caused by a given level of emissions,22 or a cap-and-
trade system, which ideally is designed to cap greenhouse gas emissions at 
the level that balances the benefits and costs of climate change.23 
The problem, however, is that economists have struggled to identify a 
value metric for measuring cost and benefits that is not parasitic on an 
implicit continuation of the status quo. For instance, the efficient resolution 
to a pollution dispute may appear quite different when victims are asked 
what they are willing to accept in exchange for being harmed than when, as 
is more typical, they are asked what they are willing (and able) to pay to 
avoid harm. Continued pollution appears more efficient in part because, as 
part of the valuation exercise, polluters are assumed to have a baseline right 
to continue polluting which must be bribed away from them. Likewise, the 
social welfare analysis of climate change and the identification of an optimal 
carbon tax may change dramatically when future generations are first 
endowed with rights over critical resources such as fossil fuels or, relatedly, 
the atmosphere’s ability to withstand greenhouse gas emissions. Even 
putting aside these fundamental matters of justice, conventional cost-benefit 
analyses of climate change still typically assume an empirically unrealistic 
potential for social, economic, and environmental systems to suffer damage 
without being critically undermined.24 Thus, the calculation of appropriate 
 
 20 See JAMES R. HACKNEY, JR., UNDER COVER OF SCIENCE: AMERICAN LEGAL-ECONOMIC THEORY 
AND THE QUEST FOR OBJECTIVITY 49–57 (2006). 
 21 Robert W. Hahn, The Impact of Economics on Environmental Policy 15 (AEI-Brookings 
Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper 99-04, 1999), available at http://www.reg-
markets.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirect-safely.php?fname=../pdffiles/WP_99-04v2.pdf. 
 22 Kenneth P. Green, Steven F. Hayward & Kevin A. Hassett, Climate Change: Caps vs. 
Taxes, ENVTL. POL’Y OUTLOOK, June 2007, at 4, 5, available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/ 
20070601_EPOg.pdf; Hahn, supra note 21, at 4.  
 23 Lee Lane, The Green Movement and the Challenge of Climate Change,  
ENVTL. POL’Y OUTLOOK, Feb. 2009, at 2, available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/01-23914%20EEO%20 
Lane-g.pdf. 
 24 For instance, environmental damage models in a recent water pollution rulemaking 
assumed that any level of juvenile fish mortality could be inflicted without ever affecting the 
underlying stock from which new juveniles would emerge in future years. See Douglas A. Kysar, 
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prices is undertaken in a manner that fails to directly examine the 
underlying systems that give rise to cost and benefit information; marginalist 
efficiency analysis is applied to a threat that may impair basic welfare-
supporting systems at their core, not merely at their margins.25 Accordingly, 
an implicit rejection of transformative policies is built into the very exercise 
that should be asking whether transformative policies are necessary. As 
critics have noted, such an approach seems driven less by a full and genuine 
confrontation with the climate change conundrum than by a disciplinary 
instinct to defend conventional methodologies in the face of that problem.26 
Climate change plaintiffs and their lawyers also attempt to depict 
climate change as a familiar externality problem.27 Frustrated by a lack of 
greenhouse gas legislation at the federal level, proponents of climate change 
governance have turned to other venues and strategies, including agency-
forcing interpretations of existing federal statutes28 and common law causes 
of action such as public nuisance.29 Thus, litigants in Massachusetts v. U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (Massachusetts v. EPA)30 depicted carbon 
dioxide (CO2) as just another Clean Air Act
31 regulated air pollutant.32 More 
germane to this Article, plaintiffs in climate change tort suits seek to treat 
greenhouse gas emissions as just another common law nuisance, the likes of 
which courts have been adjudicating for centuries.33 The underlying motive 
for this normalizing strategy is different from that of economists—“any port 
in a storm,” as the saying goes—but the resulting conceptual strain is 
similar: trying to force climate change into traditional common law 
categories calls into question basic features of tort law itself. At each stage 
of the traditional tort analysis—duty, breach, causation, and harm—the 
climate change plaintiff finds herself bumping up against doctrines that are 
 
Fish Tales, in REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 190, 195–97, 204 (Winston Harrington et 
al., eds. 2009). 
 25 See Deiter Helm, Climate-Change Policy: Why Has So Little Been Achieved?, 24 OXFORD 
REV. ECON. POL’Y 211, 221–24 (2008). 
 26 As Herman Daly puts it, “When increasingly vital facts, including the very capacity of the 
earth to support life, have to be treated as ‘externalities,’ then it is past time to change the basic 
framework of our thinking so that we can treat these critical issues internally and centrally.” 
HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 45 (1996). 
Likewise, if the foundations of modern economic activity are giving rise to the “greatest 
example of market failure we have ever seen,” NICHOLAS STERN, THE STERN REVIEW ON THE 
ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 1 (2007), then the criteria for defining market “success” and 
“failure” should be interrogated. 
 27 Jonathan Zasloff intriguingly straddles both economist and plaintiff groups by conceiving 
of the public nuisance suit as an effective means to institute a “judicial carbon tax.” Zasloff, 
supra note 3, at 1842−43. 
 28 See Massachusetts v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Press Release, Earth 
Justice, Groups Sue to Force EPA Action on California Air Pollution (May 6, 2010), 
http://www.earthjustice.org/news/press/2010/groups-sue-to-force-epa-action-on-california-air-
pollution (last visited Feb. 13, 2011). 
 29 See Zasloff, supra note 3, at 1864. 
 30 549 U.S. 497 (2007).  
 31 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006). 
 32 549 U.S. at 528–32. Their endeavor was, of course, successful. 
 33 See Zasloff, supra note 3, at 1828–29. 
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premised on a classical liberal worldview in which threats such as global 
climate change simply do not register. And just as environmental economists 
are faced with a choice between reforming the underlying architecture of 
their discipline or failing to adequately characterize the climate change 
problem, courts will be forced to either radically alter existing features of 
tort law or deem nontortious activities that nevertheless threaten core 
interests tort law claims to protect. In all likelihood, courts will follow 
economists in choosing the latter approach. 
A. Duty/Proximate Cause 
Consider first the related problems of establishing duty and proximate 
causation. Courts and commentators frequently speak of the former in terms 
that seem expansive enough to encompass, at least as an initial matter, 
activities that contribute substantially to anthropogenic climate change:  
[i]t is well settled that every person owes a duty of ordinary care to all others to 
guard against injuries which naturally flow as a reasonably probable and 
foreseeable consequence of an act, and such a duty does not depend upon 
contract, privity of interest or the proximity of relationship, but extends to 
remote and unknown persons.34  
On this account, the primary focus of the duty analysis is simply whether and 
when scientific evidence of the harmful effects of anthroprogenic greenhouse 
gas emissions developed to the point that a duty arose to guard against those 
effects through ordinary care, however “remote and unknown” the ultimate 
victims might be.  
Writers who have evaluated that question typically conclude that a duty 
attached around the time of the signing and entering into force of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).35 Eventually 
adopted by 193 nations,36 the UNFCCC states unequivocally that “human 
activities have been substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations 
of greenhouse gases (GHG), that these increases enhance the natural 
greenhouse effect, and that this will result on average in an additional 
warming of the Earth’s surface and atmosphere and may adversely affect 
 
 34 W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 671, 671 n.1 (2008) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Widlowski v. Durkee Foods, Div. of SCM Corp., 562 N.E.2d 967, 
968 (Ill. 1990)). 
 35 See, e.g., Benito Müller, Niklas Höhne & Christian Ellerman, Differentiating (Historic) 
Responsibilities for Climate Change, 9 CLIMATE POL’Y 593, 595 (2009); Zasloff, supra note 3, at 
1841 n.63. But see Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Global Warming and Social Justice, 
REGULATION, Spring 2008, at 14, 19, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/ 
regv31n1/v31n1-3.pdf (positing a later date on the unsubstantiated claim that scientific 
consensus regarding climate change emerged “only recently”). 
 36 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Status of Ratification of the Convention, 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2011). “Currently, there are 194 Parties (193 States and 1 regional economic 
integration organization) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.” Id. 
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natural ecosystems and humankind.”37 The agreement further identifies its 
“ultimate objective” as the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in 
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system.”38 Thus, taking the UNFCCC as a reliable 
indicator of when harmful consequences of greenhouse gas emissions became 
“reasonably probable and foreseeable,” it might seem that a duty of ordinary 
care to avoid climate-induced harms arose sometime around 1992.39 
Fleshing out the contours of such a duty can appear surprisingly simple. 
Scientists believe that the planet can tolerate a certain level of annual 
greenhouse gas emissions without entertaining risks of drastic disruption to 
life-supporting systems.40 Oceans, forests, and other parts of the carbon 
cycle constitute something of a natural buffer, absorbing anthropogenic 
GHGs  and potentially containing atmospheric warming below levels that 
would risk critical breakdowns in environmental and social systems (often 
taken to be 1.5°–2°C above pre-industrial temperatures).41 The German 
Advisory Council on Global Change has utilized this “guard rail” approach to 
estimate the total amount of greenhouse gases that can be emitted by 
humans between now and 2050 while still ensuring a sixty-seven percent 
chance of limiting the global mean temperature increase to 2°C.42 Divided 
equally among the world’s people, this amount allows for an annual budget 
of roughly 2.7 tons of CO2 equivalent emissions per capita through 2050, 
falling to one ton per capita in steady state thereafter.43 The duty of 
reasonable care in respect of greenhouse gas emissions would thus be fixed 
according to these guidelines and anyone emitting above their annual 
equitable allocation would be considered in breach. 
To put the guidelines in perspective, consider the following activities, 
each of which in the United States would consume approximately one ton 
from an individual’s annual emissions budget: driving a standard passenger 
vehicle for ten weeks,44 consuming household energy in an average single-
 
 37 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, 31 I.L.M. 
849, 851 (1992). 
 38 Id. at 854. 
 39 This view is buttressed by comparing two pieces of U.S. legislation, the National Climate 
Program Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. § 2902 (2006), which was almost entirely related to scientific 
research in pursuit of a better understanding of climate change and its possible impacts, and the 
U.S. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776, which specifies a goal of 
“stabilization and eventual reduction in the generation of greenhouse gases.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 13382(a)(2). On the other hand, if one takes expert views, rather than congressional 
(in)action, as the key domestic indicator, the pertinent moment of concern may be much 
earlier, as noted infra text accompanying notes 277–78. 
 40 GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON GLOBAL CHANGE (WBGU), SOLVING THE CLIMATE DILEMMA: 
THE BUDGET APPROACH 12 (2009), available at http://www.wbgu.de/fileadmin/templates/dateien/ 
veroeffentlichungen/sondergutachten/sn2009/wbgu_sn2009_en.pdf. 
 41 Id. at 13. 
 42 Id. at 15. For an effort to utilize the emissions budget approach to allocate national 
responsibility for climate change according to different theories of appropriate state behavior, 
see Müller, Höhne & Ellerman, supra note 35. 
 43 GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON GLOBAL CHANGE (WBGU), supra note 40, at 27. 
 44 A standard passenger vehicle in the United States emits the equivalent of roughly 5.2 
metric tons of CO2 per year. Calculations based on data from U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
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family home for four weeks,45 or flying roundtrip from New York City to San 
Francisco.46 Obviously, then, much of the world’s population is currently in 
violation of the duty of ordinary climate care, at least when that duty is 
defined according to our best scientific estimates of the aggregate global 
emissions level that does not compromise basic atmospheric, ecological, and 
social stability. As Figure 1 details,47 the potential class of defendants who 
currently emit above 2.7 tons of annual CO2 equivalent emissions includes 
literally billions of individuals, concentrated mainly in North America, 
Europe, and Australia48 but also increasingly found in China and other 




Of course, to put matters this way is to reveal that legal duty is not now, 
nor has it ever been, so simple. Even before vexing issues of breach, 
causation, and harm arise, climate change plaintiffs face significant 
 
Greenhouse Gas Equivalencies Calculator, http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-resources/ 
calculator.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2011). 
 45 The average home in the U.S. emits the equivalent of approximately four metric tons of 
CO2 per year per person. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Greenhouse Gas Emissions: In the Home, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/ind_home.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2011). 
 46 Calculations based on data from Carbonfund.org, How We Calculate Your Carbon 
Footprint, http://www.carbonfund.org/site/pages/carbon_calculators/category/Assumptions 
#TotalUSCO2 (last visited Feb. 13, 2011) (calculating 0.93 tons of emissions for one roundtrip 
flight for one passenger from John F. Kennedy Airport in New York to San Francisco 
International Airport). 
 47 GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON GLOBAL CHANGE (WBGU), supra note 40, at 19. Of course, a 
plethora of complications are being ignored here, including the choice of a 2°C guard rail which 
many regard as an inadequate level of protection, the possibility of reallocating emissions 
budgets based on historical responsibility for the existing stock of greenhouse gas 
concentrations, and the need to account for often dramatic disparities in emissions levels 
within nations. 
 48 See id., at 17. 
 49 See id. 
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challenges establishing the existence of any tort obligation at all, given the 
sheer pervasiveness of activities with high associated greenhouse gas 
emissions. Within American torts jurisprudence, our best signposts in the 
duty wilderness remain the contrastingly brilliant opinions in Palsgraf v. 
Long Island Railroad Company.50 For Judge Cardozo and the New York 
Court of Appeals majority, duty analysis is determined by classical liberal 
principles of responsibility. In Cardozo’s view, “[n]egligence is not 
actionable unless it involves the invasion of a legally protected interest, the 
violation of a right”; accordingly, “negligence in the air . . . will not do.’”51 
This particularized inquiry into the connection between plaintiff and 
defendant requires the judge to identify what “the eye of ordinary vigilance” 
would have foreseen as the possible result of defendant’s conduct.52 On 
Cardozo’s account, then, antisocial conduct only triggers a duty of tort 
responsibility when its potential harmful effects can be attached to 
particular, identifiable victims. Critically, those victims must rely on 
foreseeable injurious pathways that are distinctive to them. It is not enough 
to cite the wrongfulness of defendant’s behavior in relation to others. The 
benefit of a tort duty is something one owns—or does not own—personally.  
With respect to climate change, Cardozo’s approach suggests that 
states, municipalities, tribes, and other aggregative entities might be the 
most appropriate plaintiffs for a climate change suit, since the scope of the 
alleged victim would encompass a much larger, and therefore arguably more 
foreseeable, swath of climate change’s adverse impacts. Public nuisance 
would then commend itself as the logical cause of action to pursue, since it 
imports a duty to avoid injurious conduct to rights that are held by the 
public in common.53 Because harm would be conceived of as falling on the 
public’s shared interest in climate stability, the need to trace particular, 
individualized paths of foreseeability would be lessened, as would the 
apparent remoteness and attenuation of the link between defendant’s 
conduct and plaintiff’s harm. In essence, Cardozo’s classical liberal world 
of interpersonal moral relations would be scaled up to a level 
commensurate with the climate change problem. A variety of difficulties 
would remain—including the concern that public nuisance has become an 
 
 50 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
 51 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 52 Id.; see also id. at 100 (“The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, 
and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension.”). 
 53 William Blackstone defined “public nuisances” as “a species of offences against the 
public order and []economical regimen of the state; being either the doing of a thing to the 
annoyance of all the king’s [s]ubjects, or the neglecting to do a thing which the common good 
requires.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *167. The Second Restatement stresses that 
a defendant’s conduct 
does not become a public nuisance merely because it interferes with the use and 
enjoyment of land by a large number of persons. There must be some interference with a 
public right. A public right is one common to all members of the general public. It is 
collective in nature and not like the individual right that everyone has not to be assaulted 
or defamed or defrauded or negligently injured. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. g (1979). 
GAL.KYSAR.DOC 3/10/2011  12:06 PM 
14 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 41:1 
illicit end-run around the political process in the hands of zealous 
governmental plaintiffs54—but the basic structure of legal duty would be at 
least arguably fulfilled. 
In contrast to the particularistic focus of Cardozo’s approach, the 
Palsgraf dissent by Judge Andrews offers a communal notion of 
responsibility in which all actors are under a duty to avoid unreasonable 
behavior, irrespective of whether that behavior implies a particular relation 
of responsibility to plaintiffs or, indeed, of whether it actually causes harm. 
If the employees of the Long Island Railroad Company negligently assisted 
passengers onto a crowded train, as they were alleged to have done in 
Palsgraf, then they committed “a wrong not only to those who happen to be 
within the radius of danger, but to all who might have been there—a wrong 
to the public at large.”55 In contrast to Cardozo, “negligence in the air” would 
seem to be quite cognizable on Andrews’s approach, at least to the extent of 
establishing duty: “Due care is a duty imposed on each one of us to protect 
society from unnecessary danger, not to protect A, B or C alone.”56 While 
Andrews subsequently limits this expansive conception of tort responsibility 
through application of various proximate cause considerations (including 
Cardozo’s touchstone of foreseeability), at least initially Andrews’s view 
seems to be that duty is breathtakingly vast.57 Indeed, under his conception, 
the basic individual duty to avoid excessive greenhouse gas emissions 
sketched out above might well be adopted by a court. 
Volumes have been written about these two opinions and volumes more 
no doubt will follow. For present purposes, the most important implication 
of the debate between Cardozo and Andrews has to do with legal process. 
Both jurists believe that liability—even for wrongful conduct—must be 
curtailed in order for individuals to enjoy the freedoms of liberal society.58 
To put the point in contemporary terms, no one wants to see Grandma held 
responsible for climate change harms because she drove to church on 
Sunday when she could have walked, even if her weekly devotion puts her 
above an annual emissions budget. Where the two judges differ is in their 
conception of how such a curtailment of liability generally occurs. For 
Cardozo, a judge protects Grandma by holding as matter of law that no duty 
attended her choice to utilize a carbon-intensive mode of transport, given 
 
 54 See infra text accompanying note 169. 
 55 162 N.E. at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
 56 Id. 
 57 See id. at 103 (“Every one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from those 
acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others.”). Despite failing to convince a 
majority in Palsgraf, Andrews continues to attract adherents. See, e.g., Smith v. Finch, 681 
S.E.2d 147, 150 (Ga. 2009) (“[N]egligence may be established where it is shown that ‘by exercise 
of reasonable care, the defendant might have foreseen that some injury would result from his 
act or omission, or that consequences of a generally injurious nature might have been 
expected.’”); Rallis v. Demoulas Super Markets, Inc., 977 A.2d 527, 532 (N.H. 2009) (observing 
that plaintiff must show “that the defendant’s conduct created a foreseeable risk of harm; in 
other words, it was reasonably foreseeable that an injury might occur because of the 
defendant’s actions or inactions”).  
 58 See Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101 (majority opinion); see also id. at 105 (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
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the seeming unforseeability of any particular victimization from her 
contribution to climate change. For Andrews, Grandma would find her relief 
through a jury’s determination that the connection between her actions and 
any climate change harm is too remote or speculative to constitute 
proximate causation. Importantly, not only are the relevant decisionmaker 
and doctrinal apparatus different on these two approaches, but also the 
decisional attitude. For Cardozo, the judge applies rather abstract and 
formalistic notions of reasonable foreseeability, reflecting, perhaps, 
Cardozo’s ambivalent relationship toward legal realism.59 For Andrews, on 
the other hand, the jury’s analysis is unabashedly one of “practical politics,” 
“common sense,” “convenience,” and “expediency.”60 
Controversy over the precise scope and significance of duty rages to 
this day, inflamed recently by the American Law Institute (ALI)’s 
Restatement (Third) of Torts project.61 With respect to liability for physical 
and emotional harm, the ALI Reporters laid out a general duty to avoid all 
behavior that creates a risk of harm to others’ interests, seemingly without 
regard to Cardozo’s relational niceties.62 Of course, a variety of other 
doctrinal hurdles remain for plaintiffs to clear, but supporters of the Third 
Restatement approach see great advantage in keeping those hurdles 
separate from the more basic question of whether a duty of care exists in the 
first place.63 The Reporters do acknowledge that duty may be limited by 
courts in exceptional cases for reasons of public policy.64 A good example 
would be the much-discussed case of Strauss v. Belle Realty Co.,65 in which 
the New York Court of Appeals shielded Consolidated Edison from liability 
to a plaintiff who was injured from a stairway fall during the 1977 electricity 
blackout in New York City. Despite the acknowledged gross negligence of 
Consolidated Edison, despite the ready foreseeability of plaintiff and his 
injury in relation to such conduct, and despite the fact that Consolidated 
Edison’s contract with plaintiff’s landlord clearly was intended to benefit 
plaintiff and other tenants, the court nevertheless fixed upon the contract 
nexus as a convenient way “to contain liability to manageable levels.”66 
Notwithstanding the inevitable arbitrariness of such a line-drawing exercise, 
the court felt obliged to avoid the “crushing exposure to liability” that might 
otherwise result “in the case of a blackout of a metropolis of several million 
residents and visitors, each in some manner necessarily affected by a 25-
hour power failure.”67 
 
 59 See John C.P. Goldberg, The Life of the Law, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1419, 1459 (1999). 
 60 Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 103–04 (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
 61 See, e.g., Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. Keating, Abusing “Duty,” 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 265, 265–
66 (2006); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place 
of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 736 (2001). 
 62 Esper & Keating, supra note 61, at 266 (noting continuity of general duty language in 
different drafts of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM). 
 63 See Cardi & Green, supra note 34, at 722. 
 64 See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 61, at 667–69. 
 65 482 N.E.2d 34 (N.Y. 1985). 
 66 Id. at 37.  
 67 Id. at 35–36. 
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To critics, this expansive duty coupled with public policy exceptions 
invites judges to abrogate their traditional role as definers and elucidators of 
legal responsibilities, while still allowing for ad hoc “get-out-of-duty-free” 
cards such as those dispensed in Strauss. Critics point fondly to earlier eras 
in Anglo-American tort law, when liability hinged on a series of elaborately 
articulated status relationships, such as those between an innkeeper and a 
guest, a landowner and an invitee, or an employer and an employee.68 
Influential cases such as Rowland v. Christian,69 which set aside the intricate 
doctrinal structure governing duties owed by landowners in favor of loose 
case-by-case analysis, threaten to undermine social ordering by absolving 
judges of the responsibility to state in plain and principled terms what the 
legal duties of private parties are. In the view of critics, this gradual 
unhinging of duty from status seems to have been related to the increasing 
importance of instrumentalist reasoning in tort law.70 Through a realist lens, 
such as law and economics, once the standard of care is defined to be simply 
that which maximizes social welfare, then it seems obvious that the duty to 
undertake care should be applied as widely as possible. Better, in the view of 
critics, for judges to keep their ears close to the ground, defining duty in 
terms of the actual norms of respect and obligation that prevail in liberal 
society. Listening in that way, the critics suggest, judges would rarely hear 
such terms as optimal deterrence (or crushing liability, for that matter).71 
Defenders of the Third Restatement approach point out that the history 
of duty in Anglo-American tort law is more complicated than the critics’ 
account suggests. To begin with, tort law for centuries has been driven by a 
mixture of considerations, including instrumental goals, corrective justice 
principles, and communal norms.72 Moreover, much of the duty-based 
doctrinal structure that critics identify in earlier eras of tort law constituted 
a series of status-based immunities from tort responsibility (e.g., for 
sovereigns, charities, spouses, and employers).73 The practical impact of 
these various immunities should not be understated, as they worked to 
impose barriers to liability in virtually every important category of social 
interaction that a nineteenth century plaintiff might experience.74 
 
 68 See Robert L. Rabin, The Torts History Scholarship of Gary Schwartz: A Commentary, 50 
UCLA L. REV. 461, 467–68 (2002). 
 69 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968). The number of jurisdictions joining California in the Rowland 
approach continues to grow. See, e.g., Koenig v. Koenig, 766 N.W.2d 635, 639 (Iowa 2009). 
 70 See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the 
Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 601–27 (2005); John C.P. Goldberg 
& Benjamin C. Zipursky, Shielding Duty: How Attending to Assumption of Risk, Attractive 
Nuisance, and Other “Quaint” Doctrines Can Improve Decisionmaking in Negligence Cases, 79 
S. CAL. L. REV. 329, 334 (2006); see also Alexandra B. Klass, Tort Experiments in the 
Laboratories of Democracy, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1501, 1565–67 (2009). 
 71 See Jules L. Coleman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1149, 1152,  
1158–59 (2008). 
 72 See Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and 
Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1801–02 (1997). 
 73 See Rabin, supra note 68, at 472–74.  
 74 See Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A 
Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REV. 925, 952–53 (1981). 
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Accordingly, as Robert Rabin has persuasively shown, the central struggle of 
American tort law over much of its history has not been whether strict 
liability or negligence should govern unintentional harms, as commentators 
often assume, but rather whether defendants who cause unintentional harm 
owe any duty of care at all.75 Against this backdrop, the Third Restatement’s 
approach to duty seems not to represent an abrogation of the judicial 
obligation to articulate communal norms of respect and care, but rather an 
acknowledgement that those norms expanded significantly over the course 
of the last century. 
Still, it would be hasty to assume that our norms of respect and care 
have expanded adequately to support common law responsibility for the 
emission of greenhouse gases. The enduring resonance of Palsgraf has much 
to do with the fact that both of its contrasting approaches remain alive and 
at work within tort jurisprudence, to the great frustration of law students 
and scholars who seek doctrinal uniformity. Yet for purposes of limning 
greenhouse gas tort responsibilities, it may not matter whether plaintiffs’ 
claims hit a roadblock at the duty stage á la Cardozo, or only later at the 
proximate causation stage á la Andrews, given that the analytical challenges 
facing plaintiffs will be similar in either case.76 Nor will it necessarily matter 
whether plaintiffs’ case is styled as a negligence, strict liability, private 
nuisance, public nuisance, or products liability action, given the availability 
of proximate causation and other liability-curtailing devices under each 
theory. Most critically, plaintiffs will face the challenge of establishing 
foreseeability in a way that does not strain liberal notions of limited 
obligation beyond the breaking point. Unlike more familiar forms of 
pollution, greenhouse gases do not directly and locally impair human health 
and ecosystems. Instead, they begin as largely harmless emissions before 
globally dispersing throughout the atmosphere, warming the planet’s 
surface, and ultimately triggering a laundry list of complex and potentially 
harmful ripple effects throughout all natural systems.77 On the one hand, this 
 
 75 See id.; see also Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of 
Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 606 (1992); John Fabian Witt, Contingency, 
Immanence, and Inevitability in the Law of Accidents, 1 J. TORT L. 1, 21 (2007).  
 76 Settlement dynamics may well be affected, however, as Andrews’s approach seems more 
likely to result in plaintiffs reaching discovery. 
 77 The statement in the text has become an article of faith in climate policy discussions. See, 
e.g., Nicholle Winters, Note, Carbon Dioxide: A Pollutant in the Air, but Is the EPA Correct that 
It Is Not an “Air Pollutant”?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1996, 1999 (2004) (discussing the EPA Fabricant 
Memo that “focuses on the fact that carbon dioxide does not directly cause harm but is a 
greenhouse gas that contributes to global warming”). An important caveat should be noted, 
however: CO2 levels in densely populated, heavy emitting areas remain elevated due to a 
continuous stream of emissions, thereby forming a “dome” over the areas which, in turn, 
exacerbates local air pollution problems such as ground level ozone. See Healthy Planet, 
Healthy People: Global Warming and Public Health Before the H. Select Committee on Energy 
Independence and Global Warming, 110th Cong. 2–3 (2008) (statement of Mark Z. 
Jacobson), available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/efmh/jacobson/Testimony0408%202.pdf 
(summarizing evidence). Thus, local greenhouse gas emissions can cause higher levels of local 
mortality and morbidity, notwithstanding the common wisdom that “[t]he fact that [greenhouse 
gases] mix globally in the atmosphere means that hotspots are not a major concern.” Jonathan 
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may be taken to mean that “[t]he foreseeable zone of impact in the context 
of climate change, a global tort, is global, and the duty owed by defendant 
contributors to climate change arguably extends to damaged plaintiffs 
everywhere.”78 On the other hand, it may mean that courts will view the 
climate change conundrum as simply falling beyond the grasp of tort law. 
Similarly, the class of climate change defendants includes in the 
extreme anyone whose activities result in net greenhouse gas emissions, 
which is to say nearly every natural and legal person on the planet.79 As such, 
climate change is so radically diffuse in origin that it is difficult to identify 
any actors who stand out as peculiarly responsible for it. Plaintiffs are 
forced to look for apparent choke points in the anthropogenic carbon cycle, 
such as fossil fuel companies, electric utilities, motor vehicle manufacturers, 
and other entities that plausibly can be described as “responsible” for large 
volumes of emissions or that potentially can effectuate large-scale changes 
in greenhouse gas emitting activities. For good measure, plaintiffs throw in 
fraud and conspiracy counts that allow them to offer evidence of how these 
entities have distorted science and manipulated public debate on climate 
change for the better part of three decades.80 Figure 2 presents a sector-
based view of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions that seems to support 
plaintiffs’ strategy, identifying industry, transportation, and electric utilities 
as responsible for the lion’s share of U.S. emissions.81  
As Figure 3’s systems-based view of emissions shows,82 however, there 
is a problematic arbitrariness in plaintiffs’ designation of the defendant 
class: why are automakers and power plants sued rather than their 
customers?83 If most courts are unwilling to view handgun manufacturers as 
proximate contributors to the public nuisance of violent crime,84 how many 
will see the oil industry and other corporate defendants as chiefly  
 
B. Wiener, Radiative Forcing: Climate Policy to Break the Logjam in Environmental Law, 17 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 210, 215 (2008).  
 78 Hunter & Salzman, supra note 3, at 1781. 
 79 Id. at 1750.  
 80 See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 859–60 (5th Cir. 2009) (“The plaintiffs’ 
putative class action asserts claims for compensatory and punitive damages based on 
Mississippi common-law actions of . . . fraudulent misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy.”); 
Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury Trial at 47–62, Native Vill. of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 
2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. C 08-01138 SBA) (detailing civil conspiracy allegations). For 
supporting evidence, see NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT 169–215 
(2010), and DAVID MICHAELS, DOUBT IS THEIR PRODUCT 192–211 (2008). 
 81 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
THROUGH MATERIALS AND LAND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 10 (2009), available at http:// 
www.epa.gov/oswer/docs/ghg_land_and_materials_management.pdf.  
 82 Id. at 11. 
 83 It should be noted here that the Kivalina complaint limits its scope to the direct emissions 
from defendants’ activities (e.g., oil exploration, pipeline construction, and facility operation) 
rather than from use of defendants’ products by their customers. Complaint for Damages and 
Demand for Jury Trial at 1, Native Vill. of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (No. C 08-01138 SBA). In 
that respect, however, the complaint encompasses a much smaller potential share of overall 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
 84 See Richard C. Ausness, Public Tort Litigation: Public Benefit or Public Nuisance?, 77 
TEMPLE L. REV. 825, 840–53 (2004) (reviewing public nuisance handgun litigation). 
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responsible for activities that, in truth, are imbricated throughout 
modern society and that only cause harmful impacts when combined with all 
other such activities and when traced forward through an extraordinarily 
complex series of ripple effects that span the planet? How many instead will 
use longstanding duty and proximate cause principles to avoid jumping 
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Figure 3: Systems-Based View of U.S. GHG Emissions (2006) 
 
 
Problems of remoteness and attenuation do not just describe climate 
change as a policy challenge, they define it. Between the moment of 
emission and the ultimate incidence of harm lie innumerable links in a 
causal chain, many of which consist of actors with their own agency and 
arguable culpability. Thus, however articulated as a doctrinal matter, 
liability-constraining considerations are likely to bite hard against the 
climate change plaintiff. 
B. Breach 
Assuming, pace the prior discussion, that there is a common law tort 
duty with respect to greenhouse gas emissions, what is its content? The 
per capita emissions allowance framework described above is one 
approach, but it is unappealing to plaintiffs for several reasons: it is too 
obviously legislative or regulatory in nature; it applies to individual 
defendants85 when corporations and other large entities are the more 
attractive targets; and it invites consideration of plaintiffs’ own greenhouse 
gas emissions through contributory negligence, unclean hands, and related 
doctrines. Instead, plaintiffs must advance theories of liability that single 
out choices and activities of large-scale defendants, characterizing those 
 
 85 See GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON GLOBAL CHANGE (WBGU), supra note 40, at 27 
(explaining that under the per capita emissions allowance framework, individual persons would 
be budgeted emissions). 
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actors as especially significant nodes in the otherwise continuous web of 
relations that give rise to greenhouse gas emissions. Additionally, plaintiffs 
must seek a standard of liability that eschews instrumentalist balancing in 
favor of a simple focus on the severity of the victim’s harm.86 If balancing 
prevails—whether in the form of conventional negligence analysis or 
modern versions of trespass and nuisance doctrine—plaintiffs will face the 
difficult prospect of demonstrating that the defendant’s activities fail a social 
welfare cost-benefit test.87 Rather than assume the need for a safe minimum 
standard of atmospheric stability according to scientific criteria—the 
analytical foundation of the per capita emissions budget approach—
plaintiffs under a cost-benefit regime will need to persuade courts that 
greenhouse gas intensive activities pose risks that outweigh benefits, despite 
the fact that those same activities lie at the foundation of industrial society. 
Given the stakes involved in such a judgment, courts may well take 
cues from the political branches in determining what the “social value” of 
the defendant’s activities are.88 In that respect, Congress’s longstanding 
tolerance—indeed active support—of activities with substantial greenhouse 
gas emissions seems especially problematic for plaintiffs.89 Although 
scattered expressions of climate change concern from Congress can be 
identified, as the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
noted in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Company,90 “Congress has 
not acted to regulate greenhouse gas emissions in any real way.”91 Indeed, 
the most consistent stance of the body over time has been to promote 
exploration, production, and utilization of fossil fuels through subsidies, tax 
incentives, and other mechanisms.92 Continued unwillingness to adopt a 
comprehensive climate change and energy reform package forty years after 
 
 86 See Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 741, 748–49 (2003) (noting disagreement among courts regarding “whether the plaintiff 
in a public nuisance action must prove underlying tortious conduct by the defendant . . . or 
whether the existence of an objectionable condition itself establishes tortious liability” 
(footnote omitted)); Merrill, supra note 3, at 329 (“Nuisance law generally—of which public 
nuisance is a subpart—has long oscillated between a ‘trespass’ mode of analysis and a ‘cost-
benefit’ mode of analysis.”). 
 87 See Merrill, supra note 3, at 329–30. 
 88 For balancing tests, the Restatement (Second) of Torts typically asks courts to weigh “the 
social value which the law attaches to the interest,” which is promoted or threatened by 
defendant’s behavior. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 292 (1965) (emphasis added). 
Somewhat controversially, the Third Restatement has de-emphasized this social valuation 
aspect of unintentional torts in favor of private market valuations. See Kenneth W. Simons, The 
Hand Formula in the Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts: Encompassing Fairness as Well as 
Efficiency Values, 54 VAND. L. REV. 901, 925–26 (2001).  
 89 Cf. City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 513, 529 (N.D. Ohio 
2009) (observing, among several reasons for dismissing a city’s public nuisance suit against 
subprime mortgage lenders, that “federal government has enacted numerous laws and issued 
significant regulatory guidance specifically aimed at encouraging lending to traditionally 
underserved segments of the population”). 
 90 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).  
 91 Id. at 385 (emphasis added). 
 92 SALVATORE LAZZARI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30406, ENERGY TAX POLICY: AN ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 1, 7 (2005).  
GAL.KYSAR.DOC 3/10/2011  12:06 PM 
22 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 41:1 
the problem was first brought to congressional attention only underscores 
the discomfort common law judges might feel in allowing juries to declare 
greenhouse gas-intensive activities unreasonable.93 This is especially the case 
in light of Congress’s failure to act in the face of intensive global 
campaigning on behalf of climate action during the lead-up to Copenhagen in 
2009. Although merely an instance of the proverbial dog not barking, to the 
climate change policy community Congress’s silence was deafening.94 
Even judges who undertake an independent assessment of climate 
change costs and benefits will find ample evidence tending to insulate 
defendants from liability. With some notable exceptions, economic analyses 
of climate change policy recommend only a gradual reduction in greenhouse 
gas emissions in the near term, followed by steeper cuts later in the 
century.95 Thus, when looking comprehensively at the social costs and 
benefits of fossil fuel production or other greenhouse gas-intensive 
activities, courts may well conclude that the activities are not undesirable 
overall, at least not yet. Efforts by economists to calculate the “social cost of 
carbon” similarly tend to draw a favorable comparison of fossil fuel energy 
sources to lower-emitting alternatives,96 despite the extensive negative 
externalities of the former.97 For instance, an interagency working group of 
the Obama Administration recently compiled the first official U.S. 
government estimate of the human health, environmental, and other 
external costs caused by each ton of CO2 equivalent emissions. The 
working group came up with a central estimate of $21 per metric ton of 
CO2 in 2010 and $45 per metric ton in 2050.
98 Although these estimates 
 
 93 For example, Congress’s lack of legislation on global climate change was one of the 
arguments EPA relied on to win over judges at the court of appeals level in Massachusetts v. 
EPA. See Elise Korican, Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, Exploring the 
Merits of Greenhouse Gas Regulation, 28 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 193, 205 (2008).  
 94 Michael Jacobs, Is It All Over for Climate Policy in the United States?, INSIDE STORY 
(Austl.), July 29, 2010, available at http://inside.org.au/is-it-all-over-for-climate-change-policy-in-
the-united-states/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2011). 
 95 For the most notable exception and widely discussed report, see STERN, supra note 26, at 
572. Much of the difference between mainstream and dissenting economic analyses is driven by 
basic modeling assumptions regarding such matters as economic and population growth, 
intergenerational ethical obligations, appropriate methods for valuing human life, and whether 
or how to incorporate catastrophic risks from climate change. See generally DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, 
REGULATING FROM NOWHERE 7–10 (2010). Obviously, not all or even most of these matters are 
peculiarly within the economics profession’s domain of technical expertise. 
 96 See FRANK ACKERMAN & ELIZABETH A. STANTON, THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON 1, 2, 5, 16 
(2010), available at http://sei-international.org/mediamanager/documents/Publications/Climate-
mitigation-adaptation/socialcostofcarbon_sei_20100401.pdf.  
 97 Morgan McCue Sport, Comment, An Inconvenient Suit: California v. General Motors 
Corporation and a Look at Whether Global Warming Constitutes an Actionable Public Nuisance 
or a Nonjusticiable Political Question, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 583, 590–95 (2008).  
 98 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, FINAL RULE TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT (TSD): ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY PROGRAM FOR COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT: SMALL ELECTRIC 
MOTORS,   app. 15A.2 at 2–3 (2010), available at http://www1.eere.energy.gov/buildings/ 
appliance_standards/commercial/pdfs/smallmotors_tsd/sem_finalrule_appendix15a.pdf. Figures 
are reported in 2007 dollars. 
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depend on numerous controversial assumptions,99 the results of the 
working group undoubtedly will appear attractive to any common law 
judge requiring authoritative sources of information for cost-benefit 
analysis in the context of climate change. 
Consider the implications of the working group’s estimate for 
Connecticut v. American Electric Power Company. In this suit, various 
states and non-profit land trusts seek abatement of the “public nuisance” of 
“global warming,” which they believe is substantially exacerbated by the 
actions of the defendant power plants, “the five largest emitters of [CO2] in 
the United States” responsible for “approximately one quarter of the U.S. 
electric power sector’s [CO2] emissions.”
100 Putting aside for the moment 
problems of causal attribution—after all, the named defendants in the case 
appear to represent only 2.5% of worldwide annual CO2 emissions which is, 
after all, only one of the significant contributors to greenhouse gas 
concentrations101—plaintiffs still must demonstrate that the defendants’ 
activities are unreasonable. An analysis of comparative electricity 
production costs by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) suggests that 
this showing will be difficult to make.102 To begin with, the CBO did not even 
consider intermittent renewable energy sources such as wind and solar 
power or geographically limited sources such as hydroelectric or 
geothermal. In the CBO’s view, neither category could satisfy base-load 
generation needs in most parts of the country.103 Courts might similarly 
conclude that the relevant comparison group for tort scrutiny only 
includes base-load capacity sources such as nuclear and natural gas plants 
or coal-fired plants that have adopted carbon capture and sequestration 
(CCS) technology.104 
According to the CBO, the production cost advantages of coal-fired 
electricity are substantial: “Despite the high carbon intensity of conventional 
coal technology, continuing to operate existing coal-fired plants would 
remain a relatively inexpensive source of electricity until [CO2] charges 
reached about $45 per metric ton.”105 Thus, putting together the CBO’s 
estimate of comparative production costs with the interagency working 
 
 99 See ACKERMAN & STANTON, supra note 96, at 7–11. 
 100 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting the 
complaints by both the state plaintiffs and plaintiff Open Space Institute (OSI)). Plaintiffs in 
Connecticut v. American Electric Power Company actually name six electric power 
corporations as defendants but two are related American Electric Power entities. 
 101 See id. (noting plaintiffs’ allegations that named defendants represent one-quarter of U.S. 
electric power sector emissions which in the aggregate constitute ten percent of global 
emissions from human activities). 
 102 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, NUCLEAR POWER’S ROLE IN GENERATING ELECTRICITY 25–26 (2008), 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/91xx/doc9133/05-02-Nuclear.pdf.  
 103 Id. at 5. 
 104 CCS technologies aim to capture CO2 before it is released into the atmosphere from 
power plants and industrial facilities and then sequester it in geologic formations more or less 
permanently. For an overview of CCS and potential liability implications, see Alexandra B. 
Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change and Carbon Sequestration: Assessing a Liability 
Regime for Long-Term Storage of Carbon Dioxide, 58 EMORY L.J. 103 (2008).  
 105 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 102, at 7–8 (using 2006 dollars for most of the analysis). 
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group’s estimate of the social benefit of reducing carbon emissions, it would 
appear that conventional coal-fired plants may not begin to fail a cost-benefit 
test until 2050. Granted, with respect to any new power plants being built, a 
strong argument can be made that coal-fired plants without CCS technology 
are unreasonable in light of the general availability of natural gas as a fuel 
source.106 But plaintiffs in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Company 
are challenging existing facilities and the economic analysis in that regard is 
even worse from plaintiffs’ perspective, given the great cost of CCS 
technology and the uncertainty regarding its viability as a commercial-scale 
retrofit option for existing plants.107 Thus, whether viewed from the macro-
balancing perspective of nuisance or the micro-balancing perspective of 
negligence, climate change defendants will have substantial evidence to 
draw from in rebutting the charge of unreasonableness. 
Might these apparently authoritative impressions be counteracted if the 
climate change plaintiff is itself another governmental entity? As noted 
above,108 public nuisance is an attractive theory of liability for plaintiffs given 
that it focuses on harms to the public interest, helping to close some of the 
remoteness and attenuation that otherwise accompanies claims of climate 
change injury. Unlike the private nuisance claim, which focuses 
paradigmatically on unique and limited harms imposed by one landowner on 
an adjacent or nearby landowner, the public nuisance claim challenges any 
“unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public.”109 
Traditionally, public nuisances have included a variety of harmful activities 
that seem somewhat analogous to the problem of greenhouse gas emissions, 
at least if one ignores vast differences in scale and complexity.110 In terms of 
formal doctrinal language, the public nuisance category also seems quite 
naturally to reach greenhouse gas emissions. The Second Restatement 
provides that an unreasonable interference occurs whenever the defendant’s 
“conduct involves a significant interference with the public health, the public 
 
 106 Combined cycle natural gas facilities produce roughly half as much CO2 as coal-fired 
plants. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Natural Gas, http://epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-and-
you/affect/natural-gas.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2011). The cost differential between coal and 
gas facilities can be as low as $5 per metric ton. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 102, at 26; see 
also Hunter & Salzman, supra note 3, at 1773 (distinguishing between existing and new coal-
fired power plants for purposes of negligence analysis). Of course, with respect to new 
facilities, plaintiffs face the additional problem of securing relief for prospective injuries. See 
infra text accompanying notes 113–15. 
 107 Credible estimates suggest a $60 per U.S. ton price is needed to make CCS technology 
cost competitive, a figure that, again, is well below the interagency working group’s estimate of 
the social cost of carbon. See Dan Charles, Stimulus Gives DOE Billions for Carbon-Capture 
Project, 323 SCIENCE 1158 (Feb. 27, 2009). 
 108 See supra text accompanying note 53. 
 109 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (1979). 
 110 See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 88, at 583–85 (4th ed. 1971) 
(listing “interferences with the public health, as in the case of a hogpen, the keeping of diseased 
animals, or a malarial pond . . . with the public comfort, as in the case of bad odors, smoke, dust 
and vibration; with public convenience, as by obstructing a highway or a navigable stream, or 
creating a condition which makes travel unsafe or highly disagreeable” (footnotes omitted)). 
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safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the public convenience,”111 or 
when “the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a permanent or 
long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, has a 
significant effect upon the public right.”112 
In addition to addressing harms common to the public, an advantage of 
the Second Restatement formulation for plaintiffs is that it seems to focus 
on the severity of the alleged harm, rather than on a welfarist assessment of 
whether the defendant’s activity is socially desirable on net. This stricter 
formulation used to appear even in the private nuisance context, especially 
among jurists influenced by a strong classical liberal vision of the sanctity of 
property rights.113 To the extent that it retains vitality today, the formulation 
is most likely to prevail in public nuisance cases, strongly counseling in 
favor of that cause of action for plaintiffs.114 On the other hand, the 
 
 111 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2)(a) (1979). 
 112 Id. § 821B(2)(c). 
 113 See, e.g., McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 160 N.E. 391, 391–92 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, 
J.) (“Nuisance as a concept of the law has more meanings than one. The primary meaning does 
not involve the element of negligence as one of the essential factors. One acts sometimes at 
one’s peril. In such circumstances, the duty to desist is absolute whenever conduct, if persisted 
in, brings damage to another. Illustrations are abundant. One who emits noxious fumes or gases 
day by day in the running of his factory may be liable to his neighbor though he has taken all 
available precautions. He is not to do such things at all, whether he is negligent or careful.” 
(citations omitted)); Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 101 N.E. 805, 806 (N.Y. 1913) (“Although 
the damage to the plaintiff may be slight as compared with the defendant’s expense of abating 
the condition, that is not a good reason for refusing an injunction. Neither courts of equity nor 
law can be guided by such a rule, for if followed to its logical conclusion it would deprive the 
poor litigant of his little property by giving it to those already rich.”). Generalizations of this sort 
are, of course, a hazardous activity. In addition to moderating the standard of liability, courts 
have frequently limited the availability of injunctive relief in order to alleviate the seemingly 
anti-utilitarian consequences of the strict property rights conception. The most widely 
discussed such case is Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Company, 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970) 
(allowing vacation of an injunction against the defendant if permanent damages were paid to 
the plaintiff by the defendant); although judicial ingenuity in the crafting of remedies to avoid 
large-scale economic dislocation long pre-dates Boomer. See, e.g., Louise A. Halper, Nuisance, 
Courts and Markets in the New York Court of Appeals, 1850-1915, 54 Alb. L. Rev. 301, 302 
(1990); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827 cmt. b (1979) (“The gravity of the harm, 
as objectively weighed . . . may be found so severe that in and of itself it requires compensation, 
regardless of the weight of the utility of the conduct.” (emphasis added)). 
 114 See, e.g., Cox v. City of Dallas, Tex., 256 F.3d 281, 290 (5th Cir. 2001) (observing that 
“public nuisance law tends to impose liability more often on the basis of strict liability [than 
negligence]”); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1051 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that 
liability for public nuisance exists under New York law “irrespective of negligence or fault”); 
United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 722 F. Supp. 960, 968 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (“[F]ault 
is not an issue, the inquiry being limited to whether the condition created, not the conduct 
creating it, is causing damage to the public.” (quoting State v. Schenectady Chems., Inc., 459 
N.Y.S.2d 971, 979 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983))); Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg v. City of 
Philadelphia, 643 F. Supp. 713, 726 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (“At common law, neither individuals nor 
municipalities have the right to maintain for any period of time activities that constitute a public 
nuisance, irrespective of lack of fault or due care.”); State v. Fermenta ASC Corp., 608 N.Y.S.2d 
980, 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (“[A] plaintiff in an action to abate a public nuisance is not required 
to demonstrate negligence or willful conduct on behalf of the defendant.”); Commonwealth v. 
Barnes & Tucker Co., 319 A.2d 871, 883 (Pa. 1974) (“The absence of facts supporting concepts 
of negligence, foreseeability or unlawful conduct is not in the least fatal to a finding of the 
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traditional form of relief in public nuisance suits brought by governmental 
actors is equitable rather than compensatory.115 Thus, the combination of a 
potent standard of liability with a presumptive entitlement to injunctive 
relief would put judges in a difficult position, as they are understandably 
reluctant to shut down activities of central economic importance. Many 
commentators questioned the litigation strategy of plaintiffs in Connecticut 
v. American Electric Power Company because their prayer for structured 
injunctive relief, gradually abating defendants’ greenhouse gas emissions, 
seemed to invite the court to dismiss the case on political question 
grounds.116 To the surprise of many observers, a Second Circuit panel ruled 
that the political question doctrine does not pose a barrier to adjudication.117 
Nevertheless, the district court might still be able to avoid the wide-ranging 
implications of plaintiffs’ suit by adopting a balancing standard of liability 
rather than a stricter, more harm-focused standard. On the balancing 
approach, a predicate finding of breach will be more elusive and the third 
rail of injunctive relief might still be avoided. 
The essential point is that courts in environmental tort cases often seem 
driven by the type of relief looming at the end of a course of analysis.118 For 
instance, those courts that maintain a strict conception of trespass liability, 
in which an injunction is the presumptive form of relief, are less likely to 
conceive of pollution as a physical invasion despite acknowledging that 
particulate matter is, well, matter.119 Conversely, those courts that either 
count pollution as a physical invasion or adopt a strict conception of 
nuisance liability are less likely to hold onto the presumption that injunctive 
 
existence of a common law public nuisance.”); Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244, 1247 (R.I. 1982) 
(“The essential element of an actionable nuisance is that persons have suffered harm or are 
threatened with injuries that they ought not have to bear.”); Branch v. W. Petroleum, Inc., 657 
P.2d 267, 274 (Utah 1982) (“Unlike most other torts, [nuisance law] is not centrally concerned 
with the nature of the conduct causing the damage, but with the nature and relative importance 
of the interests interfered with or invaded.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 20 cmt. c (2010) 
(noting that while the Restatement (Second) section elucidating nuisance liability “is explained 
in the language of unreasonableness, that Section in essence rests on an idea of strict liability: it 
is appropriate for the defendant to compensate the plaintiff even though the defendant has in 
general behaved in a reasonable way”). As always, exceptions exist: in Maryland, it appears that 
private nuisance liability is strict while public nuisance requires a showing of unreasonableness. 
See Adams v. NVR Homes, Inc., 193 F.R.D. 243, 256 (D. Md. 2000). For an attempt to disentangle 
public and private nuisance, both historically and practically, see Robert Abrams & Val 
Washington, The Misunderstood Law of Public Nuisance: A Comparison with Private Nuisance 
Twenty Years After Boomer, 54 ALB. L. REV. 359 (1990). 
 115 See Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance: Maintaining 
Rational Boundaries on a Rational Tort, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 541, 542 (2006). 
 116 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Plaintiffs seek an order (i) holding each of the 
Defendants jointly and several liable for contributing to an ongoing public nuisance, global 
warming, and (ii) enjoining each of the Defendants . . . by capping its emissions of carbon 
dioxide and then reducing those emissions by a specific percentage each year for at least a 
decade.”); see, e.g., Zasloff, supra note 3, at 1839. 
 117 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 332 (2d Cir. 2009). A ruling, it must be 
stressed, that could be overturned by the Supreme Court. 
 118 Cf. Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of the Special 
Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 772 n.59 (2001). 
 119 See Adams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 602 N.W.2d 215, 223 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). 
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relief is awarded to successful plaintiffs.120 To thread the needle, then, 
plaintiffs in climate change suits may need to both persuade the court to 
eschew balancing in favor of a strict form of protection and limit their prayer 
for relief to damages only. This may mean that governmental plaintiffs and 
private plaintiffs suing under a public nuisance theory should not join forces, 
given that the former are somewhat restricted in their ability to seek 
damages.121 On the other hand, states suing in their proprietary capacity as 
landowners typically are not restricted from pursuing damages,122 and the 
states’ proprietary holdings may be vast enough to achieve much of the goal 
of climate change litigation.123 Alternatively, governmental plaintiffs may 
seek to style their prayer for relief as equitable in nature, even though it 
simply amounts to a request for monetary funds to reimburse public entities 
for climate change adaptation and compensation expenses.124 Either way, the 
goal of the litigation will be to persuade a court to adopt the strict 
conception of public nuisance liability without raising the prospect of a 
politically radioactive and judicially unwieldy injunction. 
To date, the best attempt to pass through this narrow needle is Native 
Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp (Kivalina).125 In this suit, the city of 
Kivalina, Alaska and the governing body of approximately 400 Inupiat 
Eskimo residents challenge twenty-four oil, energy, and utility companies, 
seeking monetary compensation for expenses associated with relocating the 
town.126 Both the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office determined that Kivalina must be relocated 
imminently on account of increased erosion risk from permafrost melting, 
 
 120 See, e.g., Davis v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 445 P.2d 481, 483 (Or. 1968) (holding that “the 
social value of defendant’s conduct, its efforts to prevent the harm and other circumstances that 
tend to justify an intrusion cannot be considered” when assessing trespass liability, but that 
such considerations do apply when assessing whether injunctive relief should be afforded). 
Those courts that have moved more squarely into the world of cost-benefit balancing have less 
reason to be concerned about the prospect of an unpopular court-issued injunction, given that 
only activities deemed harmful on net will be under threat of court cessation.  
 121 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(1) (1979). 
 122 See Raymond H. Brescia, On Public Plaintiffs and Private Harms: The Standing of 
Municipalities in Climate Change, Firearms, and Financial Crisis Litigation, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 7, 45 (2010). 
 123 For instance, in California’s public nuisance suit against the six largest automakers, the 
state sought compensation for  
billions of dollars in damages, including millions of dollars of funds expended to 
determine the extent, location, and nature of future harms and to prepare for and 
mitigate those harms, and billions of dollars of current harm to the value of flood control 
infrastructure and natural resources such as the snow pack and coastline that are vital to 
the well-being of the State. 
Complaint for Damages and Declaratory Judgment at 13, California v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 
WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (No. C06-05755 MJJ), available at http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/ 
cms06/06-082_0a.pdf. 
 124 See Richard O. Faulk & John S. Gray, Alchemy in the Courtroom? The Transmutation of 
Public Nuisance Litigation, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 941, 1003–05 (2007) (criticizing a similar 
attempt in the context of lead paint litigation). 
 125 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 126 Id. at 868–69. 
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sea ice decline, and other manifestations of climate change.127 Of all the 
climate change tort cases, this suit seems to be the best pled. The Village of 
Kivalina not only represents a governmental plaintiff, but an extremely 
sympathetic one whose constituents are among the most vulnerable people 
in the world to climate change while also being among the least responsible 
for it.128 Moreover, as discussed below, the primary alleged harm in 
Kivalina—infrastructural damage resulting from enhanced storm exposure 
due to decreased Arctic sea ice129—is more amenable to causal attribution 
than many other impacts of climate change. Perhaps most critically, 
plaintiffs in Kivalina only seek monetary recovery and the extent of their 
claim is cabined by pre-existing official estimates of their relocation costs.130 
Finally, although the amount sought in damages is not trivial—the federal 
government estimates it will cost between $95 and $400 million to move the 
village131—the chosen defendants in Kivalina include some of the most 
profitable corporations in the world.132 
Notwithstanding these strengths, the federal district court dismissed 
the Kivalina complaint on justiciability grounds.133 Critical to the court’s 
conclusion was a belief that plaintiffs’ theory of the case would require the 
court to “balance the utility and benefit of the alleged nuisance against the 
harm caused,” an analysis that appeared to draw the court inexorably into 
political juggling of “inter alia, the energy-producing alternatives that were 
available in the past and . . . their respective impact on far ranging issues 
such as their reliability as an energy source, safety considerations and the 
impact of the different alternatives on consumers and business at every 
level.”134 Plaintiffs’ theory of the case, however, is built on a different 
 
 127 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Kivalina Relocation Master Plan Final Report 06, 
http://www.poa.usace.army.mil/en/cw/Kivalina/Kivalina.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2011); Alaska 
Native Villages: Villages Affected by Flooding and Erosion Have Difficulty Qualifying for 
Federal Assistance Before the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 108th Cong. 3 (2004) (statement of 
Robert A. Robinson, Managing Director for Natural Resources and Environment), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04895t.pdf. 
 128 See Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury Trial at ¶ 46, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. 
ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. 08-cv-01138-SBA), 2008 WL 594713 
¶¶ 187–88. 
 129 Native Vill. of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 869. 
 130 Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury Trial at ¶ 4, 70, Native Vill. of Kivalina, 663 
F. Supp. 2d 863 (No. C 08-01138 SBA).  
 131 Id. at 4.  
 132 Native Vill. of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 868 n.1. Under both public and private nuisance 
doctrine, one consideration weighing in favor of relief can be the simple distributive fact that 
defendants are able to bear the cost of compensation or abatement in the context of significant 
harms. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 826(b), 829A (1979).  
 133 Native Vill. of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 868. 
 134 Id. at 874. In making the determination that balancing would be required, the court 
cherry-picked seemingly supportive language from comment e to section 821B of the Second 
Restatement, but overlooked numerous other instances in the Second Restatement that support 
a stricter approach. See infra text accompanying note 173. The district judge in California v. 
General Motors Corp, which was later voluntarily dismissed by California following its 
successful regulatory efforts against the auto industry, made a similar leap. 2007 WL 2726871, at 
*8 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 17, 2007) (“Plaintiff’s claim would require the Court to balance the 
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conception of nuisance liability. Plaintiffs are not asking for judicial 
“determination of what would have been an acceptable limit on the level of 
greenhouse gases emitted by [d]efendants,”135 as the court put it. Instead, 
they are asking for revitalization of an earlier conception of nuisance liability 
that focuses only on the severity of plaintiffs’ harm. In essence, they are 
asking the court to reinscribe a classical liberal conception of property 
rights in which the interest of landowners in the use and enjoyment of 
property is protected with stronger sauce than modern welfarist balancing.136 
After all, if one accepts the normative argument that property is intended to 
create a private sphere of sovereignty within which individuals and groups 
can find shelter from majoritarian incursion and oppression, then the Alaska 
Natives of Kivalina deserve such sovereignty, if any landowner does.137  
The Kivalina plaintiffs may have another chance to press their argument 
dismissal if the Supreme Court in its review of Connecticut v. American 
Electric Power does not prevent federal common law adjudication 
altogether. Nevertheless, even if they clear jurisdictional and justiciability 
hurdles, the Kivalina plaintiffs still will need to persuade the court to adopt a 
strict conception of nuisance liability. And even if they clear that hurdle, 
they will only find themselves in yet another pickle: having advanced a 
classical liberal conception of strong property rights protection in order to 
establish duty and breach, they will then need to quickly shift to an 
instrumentalist framework in order to deal with problems of causation. As 
the next Part explains, it is precisely tort law’s classical liberal foundation 
that limits the ability of courts to trace climate change harms to defendants’ 
activities according to orthodox causation principles. Thus, for plaintiffs to 
succeed, the same judge who views nuisance law as a strict bulwark in 
defense of property rights must then adopt an optimal deterrence lens to see 
the wisdom of unusual probabilistic causation doctrines. Tort is always 
pluralist in its goals and conceptions, but this amount of internal dissonance 
is probably too much for a single case to bear.  
C. Causation 
The most significant challenge for climate change tort suits lies in 
proving causation.138 To be sure, the president of the National Academy of 
Sciences testified in 2006 before the U.S. House of Representatives that “we 
understand the mechanisms of CO2 and climate better than we do of what 
causes lung cancer . . . . In fact, it is fair to say that global warming may be 
 
competing interests of reducing global warming emissions and the interests of advancing and 
preserving economic and industrial development.”). 
 135 Native Vill. of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 876. 
 136 See Jonathan H. Adler, Taking Property Rights Seriously: The Case of Climate Change, 26 
SOC. PHILANTHROPIC & POL’Y, Summer 2009, at 296, 306. 
 137 See id. at 299, 304.  
 138 Vincent S. Oleszkiewicz & Douglas B. Sanders, The Advent of Climate Change Litigation 
Against Corporate Defendants, 35 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 2365, 2369 (Nov. 12, 2004) (“Causation is 
the crucial issue for defendants because it will be the most difficult for a plaintiff to 
demonstrate . . . .”). 
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the most carefully and fully studied scientific topic in human history.”139 
Nevertheless, defendants might take a cue from the tobacco playbook, 
finding it cost-effective to contest even rudimentary aspects of climate 
change science, just as tobacco defendants successfully deterred and 
prolonged lawsuits by fiercely challenging basic medical facts regarding 
carcinogenicity and addictiveness.140 In the administrative law realm, the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce and others have filed suit against the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) for its greenhouse gas endangerment finding under 
the Clean Air Act.141 Bolstered by scientifically marginal but nonetheless 
damaging revelations of error in the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), these litigants promise a 
“Scopes Monkey Trial of the 21st century.”142 Both the EPA and courts have 
relied heavily on IPCC assessments in evaluating the links between 
greenhouse gas emissions, global warming, and adverse impacts.143 Thus, the 
IPCC’s public relations disaster could well be viewed as a litigation 
opportunity by climate change defendants. 
Assuming that the basic anthropogenic greenhouse effect is not 
contested, plaintiffs still face a variety of conceptual and empirical 
difficulties in their attempts to connect any individual climate-related harm 
to particular defendants’ emissions. The most blunt barrier is posed by tort 
law’s traditional requirement of but-for causation: “Under orthodox 
common law rules concerning causation, a tortfeasor is liable for an 
indivisible injury that would not have happened absent that party’s 
breach.”144 Even though this mechanistic vision of causation has long since 
been abandoned by scientists in favor of a probabilistic one, courts 
continue to cling to the but-for requirement in order to implement the 
classical liberal vision of tort as a system of rules prescribing right conduct 
within interpersonal relations.145 Singling out defendant’s behavior as a 
 
 139 Questions Surrounding the ‘Hockey Stick’ Temperature Studies: Implication for Climate 
Change Assessments Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. 
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong., 674 743 (July 27, 2006) (statement by Ralph 
Cicerone, President, National Academy of Sciences). 
 140 See Robert L. Rabin, Institutional and Historical Perspectives on Tobacco Tort Liability, 
in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 110, 112–13, 116 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. 
Sugarman eds., 1993) (outlining the early strategies of tobacco litigation).  
 141 Jim Tankersley, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Seeks Trial on Global Warming, L.A. TIMES, 
August 25, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/25/nation/na-climate-trial25 (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2011). 
 142 Id. (quoting unnamed Chamber of Commerce officials). 
 143 See, e.g., EPA’s Denial of the Petitions to Reconsider the Endangerment and Cause or 
Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 
49,556, 49,569 (Aug. 13, 2010); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 507 n.9, 508–09 (2007).  
 144 Jane Stapleton, The Two Explosive Proof-of-Causation Doctrines Central to Asbestos 
Claims, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1011, 1012 (2009).  
 145 See Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of Scientific 
Uncertainty in Hazardous-Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 469, 471 (1988) (“[T]he 
causal concepts derived from Newtonian physics are quite similar to those that inform the law, 
although they are no longer essential to science.”). Academic criticisms of the orthodox 
approach are legion. See Jonathan C. Mosher, A Pound of Cause for a Penny of Proof: The 
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necessary cause of plaintiff’s harm is seen as prerequisite to the invocation 
of judicial authority to reallocate losses from where they otherwise fall 
within private ordering. Put more affirmatively, if tort law’s “main idea is 
about permitting people an avenue of civil recourse through which to 
redress the wrongful injurings done to them,”146 then that same idea is 
likely to affect how courts assess the causal relationship between the doer 
and the done. When a plaintiff’s proof bears the form of a text on quantum 
physics rather than a morality play, the case will seem to involve the kind 
of risk prevention and insurance endeavors that are characteristic of the 
administrative state, rather than the common law.147 
Climate change science presents numerous problems for plaintiffs in 
this regard. First, most climate-related harms—such as those resulting from 
hurricanes, heat waves, droughts, seasonal allergies, pest invasions, or 
disease infections—already have a nontrivial background rate of occurrence, 
separate and apart from anthropogenic global warming.148 Thus, under 
orthodox causation rules, plaintiffs will need to demonstrate that the human 
warming factor more than doubled the risk that their particular harm would 
have occurred.149 Anything less, and plaintiffs will have failed to show that 
their harm more likely than not resulted from anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
emissions.150 This barrier might seem to be insurmountable, but it is not. 
 
Failed Economy of an Eroded Causation Standard in Toxic Tort Cases, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 
531, 531 n.1 (2003) (gathering sources). 
 146 Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate Cause, 44 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1247, 1272 (2009).  
 147 Consider the following discussion: 
Regulatory and advisory bodies . . . utilize a “weight of the evidence” method to assess 
the carcinogenicity of various substances in human beings and suggest or make 
prophylactic rules governing human exposure. This methodology results from the 
preventive perspective that the agencies adopt in order to reduce public exposure to 
harmful substances. The agencies’ threshold of proof is reasonably lower than that 
appropriate in tort law, which “traditionally make[s] more particularized inquiries into 
cause and effect” and requires a plaintiff to prove “that it is more likely than not that 
another individual has caused him or her harm.” 
Allen v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 198 (5th Cir. 1996) (alteration in original) (quoting Wright 
v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1105, 1107 (8th Cir. 1996)). 
 148 See Mimura et al., supra note 18, at 83 (noting that climate change attribution depends on 
a demonstration that “observed changes are (1) unlikely to be due entirely to natural internal 
climate variability; (2) consistent with estimated or modeled responses to the given 
combination of anthropogenic and natural forcing; and (3) not consistent with alternative, 
physically plausible explanations of recent climate change”). 
 149 See, e.g., DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 957–59 (3d Cir. 1990); Manko 
v. United States, 636 F. Supp. 1419, 1434 (W.D. Mo. 1986), aff’d in relevant part, 830 F.2d 831 
(8th Cir. 1987).  
 150 DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 957–59; Manko, 636 F. Supp. at 1434. The Third Restatement 
discourages the use of a formulaic relative risk factor requirement at the general causation 
stage, preferring to allow plaintiffs to attempt to refine the evidence through “differential 
etiology” and other methods at the specific causation stage, “[s]o long as there is adequate 
evidence of general causation.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 28 cmt. c(3) (2010). Whether 
the strong filter is applied at the general or the specific causation stage, however, plaintiffs 
ultimately will need to demonstrate that their particular harm was more likely than not the 
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Some climate change impacts, for instance, are akin to what is known as a 
“signature disease” in toxic tort parlance, in that the impacts simply would 
not have occurred absent anthropogenic climate change.151 The harm alleged 
in Kivalina may well fit this characterization. In a world without human-
induced warming—that is, in the counterfactual world required by the 
orthodox causation test—plaintiffs in Kivalina could have continued to 
inhabit their village without substantial fear of sea level rise, storm surge, 
permafrost erosion, or other climate-related threats to habitability for 
hundreds of years.  
The problem of cryosphere152 melting that lies behind Kivalina’s woes 
will give rise to other signature impacts of climate change. In its Fourth 
Assessment Report on Climate Change, the IPCC focused considerable 
attention on the role of temperature change as a direct driver of climate 
change impacts, given that “physical and biological responses to changing 
temperatures are often better understood than responses to other climate 
parameters, and the anthropogenic signal is easier to detect for temperature 
than for other parameters.”153 Furthermore, the evidence for shrinking of the 
cryosphere—including melting of glaciers, snow, sea ice, and permafrost—is 
strong and the “effects in the environment and in human activities are 
already detectable.”154 Among such effects are glacier retreat, glacial lake 
flooding and outburst, and reduced snowpack at low altitudes,155 with 
adverse implications for municipal water suppliers, ski resorts, tourism 
companies, snow runway operators, and other potential climate change 
plaintiffs. Ironically, even oil companies might claim to have suffered a 
signature climate change impact given the reduced number of exploration 
days available in the Arctic due to thawing of ice roads.156 
Even for non-signature impacts, climate modeling in some cases can 
enable relatively fine parsing of natural and human contributions to the risk 
of adverse events. A study published in the journal Nature, for instance, 
estimated that the 2003 European heat wave, which resulted in the 
premature death of approximately 22,000 to 35,000 people, was at least two 
times more likely to have occurred as a result of the human contribution to 
 
result of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, unless they can avail themselves of an 
unusual doctrine such as the substantial risk factor test for causation. See infra text 
accompanying notes 321–22. 
 151 Cf. Allen et al., supra note 3, at 1384 (“The key difference between long-term, catastrophic 
impacts of GHG increases and more mundane short-term impacts is that we might, in some 
instances, be able to say with confidence that some of these long-term impacts would not have 
occurred in the absence of human influence on climate.”). 
 152 The cryosphere is “[t]he component of the climate system consisting of all snow and ice 
(including permafrost) on and beneath the surface of the Earth and ocean.” Mimura et al., supra 
note 18, at 873. 
 153 Id. at 84. 
 154 Id. at 89. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. at 86 tbl.1.2 (noting decline in travel days in the Alaskan tundra from 220 to 130 days 
per year). 
GAL.KYSAR.DOC 3/10/2011  12:06 PM 
2011] CLIMATE CHANGE, TORT LAW 33 
global warming.157 Likewise, some experts now believe that the collapse of 
lobster fisheries south of Cape Cod is directly attributable to warmer 
ocean temperatures from climate change, as other explanations have been 
tested and excluded.158 Thus, with respect to these events, credible 
scientific evidence exists to support a finding of causation, even under the 
restrictive more-likely-than-not formulation. Fortuitously for plaintiffs, the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has formed a “Climate 
Scene Investigators” unit that is specifically tasked with evaluating 
extreme climate and weather events for evidence of an anthropogenic 
climate change fingerprint.159 
Much will depend on the particular harm involved. Plaintiffs in Comer 
v. Murphy Oil USA (Comer v. Murphy Oil ) ,160 for instance, have a much 
tougher row to hoe, given that their primary claims “rely on allegations of a 
causal link between greenhouse gas emissions, global warming, and the 
destruction of the plaintiffs’ property by rising sea levels and the added 
ferocity of Hurricane Katrina.”161 Although studies predict a substantial 
future increase in the severity and damage potential of Atlantic hurricanes 
due to human-induced rises in sea temperature and sea level, retrospective 
analyses of the human contribution to the risk of an event like Hurricane 
Katrina are much more equivocal.162 Unfortunately for climate change 
 
 157 Peter A. Stott et al., Human Contribution to European Heatwave of 2003, 432 NATURE 610, 
610 (2004); see also Daithi A. Stone et al., The Detection and Attribution of Human Influence on 
Climate, in 34 ANN. REV. ENVIRON. & RESOURCES 1, 10–11 (Ashok Gadgil & Diana M. Liverman 
eds., 2009) (explaining methodology behind the heat wave study); Allen et al., supra note 3, at 
1392 (observing that the heat wave researchers utilized a conservative assumption of normal 
probability assumptions when a fat-tail distribution may have been more appropriate).  
 158 See Doug Fraser, Cape Lobster Industry Faces Crisis, CAPE COD TIMES, June 13,  
2010,  http://www.capecodonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100613/NEWS/6130340/-1/ 
NEWSMAP. Alternative explanations include overfishing, water pollution, invasive species, and 
disease. Through experimental and observational means, scientists have determined that these 
explanations cannot account for recent drastic declines in lobster populations in the southern 
portion of their North Atlantic habitat. Importantly, the remaining suspect—warmer water 
temperatures—is not merely the last explanation standing, but a well-understood and studied 
driver of health impairment and reproductive decline among lobsters. Cf. Neal C. Stout & Peter 
A. Valberg, Bayes’ Law, Sequential Uncertainties, and Evidence of Causation in Toxic Tort 
Cases, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 781, 889–90 (2005) (“Generally, the more alternative possible 
causes there are for the injury, or the more likely an alternative possible cause explains the 
injury, the more explanation (specificity) courts should require from the causation expert as to 
why the subject agent is the probable cause.”). 
 159 See Katy Human, CSI: NOAA Climate Scene Investigators, CLIMATEWATCH 
MAGAZINE,  Oct. 23, 2009, http://www.climatewatch.noaa.gov/2009/articles/csi-noaa-climate-
scene-investigators. 
 160 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), panel opinion vacated en banc, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 161 Id. at 863. 
 162 See Thomas R. Knutson et al., Tropical Cyclones and Climate Change, 3 NATURE 
GEOSCIENCES 157, 157 (2010) (“[I]t remains uncertain whether past changes in tropical cyclone 
activity have exceeded the variability expected from natural causes. However, future 
projections based on theory and high-resolution dynamical models consistently indicate that 
greenhouse warming will cause the globally averaged intensity of tropical cyclones to shift 
towards stronger storms . . . .”); Morris A. Bender et al., Modeled Impact of Anthropogenic 
Warming on the Frequency of Intense Atlantic Hurricanes, 327 SCIENCE 454, 454 (2010) (utilizing 
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plaintiffs, the majority of expected impacts are likely to present a 
complicated causal picture similar to that of hurricanes. With respect to 
vector-borne diseases, allergies, and other health impacts, for instance, 
causal attribution is complicated by a lack of long-term data relating climate 
and health, and by the significant effects of wealth, demographics, 
technology, and other non-climate drivers.163 Unless courts are willing to 
adopt a significant risk test for causation—under which plaintiffs could 
proceed merely if defendant’s conduct was shown to have created a 
significant risk of the harm occurring164—many climate change plaintiffs will 
simply fail to meet their actual causation burden. 
Again, the logic behind a governmental plaintiff and a public nuisance 
cause of action becomes plain, as a state or a city might cite the entire time 
series of hurricanes, heat waves, or other adverse events as falling under its 
purview and therefore amenable to judicial relief.165 From this perspective, 
recovery arguably would not need to depend on showing that any particular 
event more likely than not resulted from anthropogenic climate change. 
Instead, the governmental plaintiff would cite the entire trend of adverse 
events and seek abatement or restitution on account of elevations in the 
trend. The harm alleged would thus fit the epistemological shape of climate 
science. Other high-profile uses of public nuisance litigation, however, 
suggest that courts are unlikely to embrace this aggregative view. 
Governmental plaintiffs in suits against the tobacco industry urged a 
statistical causation approach that did not require identification of particular 
victims of smoking-related diseases, but instead only an epidemiologically 
identified elevation in disease among the relevant population group.166 
However, the reasoning of at least one state court suggests that such an 
approach might violate the state’s constitutional due process clause,167 and 
the theory more generally was not tested in courts prior to the Master 
Settlement Agreement that ended most litigation by states against the 
tobacco industry. Subsequent cases against the lead paint industry, handgun 
 
a hurricane-prediction model to project a doubling of the frequency of category four and five 
storms by the end of the twenty-first century). 
 163 See Mimura et al., supra note 18, at 107; see also id. at 84 (noting that, for many climate 
change impacts, “decades of data may be needed in order to separate the response to [natural] 
climate oscillations from that due to longer-term climate change”). A recent report in Nature, 
for instance, suggested that fears of malaria expansion due to climate change are overstated, in 
light of the ability of public-health measures such as improved access to medications and 
preventative measures such as bed nets to outweigh the effects of temperature on mosquito 
populations and bite frequency. See Heidi Ledford, Malaria May Not Rise as World Warms, 465 
NATURE 280, 280 (2010). 
 164 See infra text accompanying notes 321–22. 
 165 See Hunter & Salzman, supra note 3, at 1793 (“[T]he states’ claims of public nuisance are 
not premised on any one specific weather event, so they may not be required to show that 
climate change has resulted in a specific hurricane or drought—just that, generally, over time 
climate change may have certain impacts (e.g., declines in snowpack, more intense storms, and 
warmer temperatures).”).  
 166 Gifford, supra note 86, at 753.  
 167 Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., 678 So.2d 1239, 1253–55 
(Fla. 1996). 
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manufacturers, and subprime mortgage lenders have also revealed only faint 
appetite among courts for creative use of the public nuisance cause of 
action.168 Much of the criticism levied against these cases has been that 
governmental plaintiffs appear to be pressing public nuisance theories as an 
end-run around conventional causation requirements.169 
A second causation challenge facing plaintiffs has to do with the 
extraordinary numerosity of greenhouse gas emitters. As noted above, this 
numerosity spells trouble for the establishment of duty. It also has profound 
implications for causation, as any individual defendant can quite plausibly 
offer the “consequentialist alibi” that its emissions are simply too small of a 
share of global emissions to cause a discernable difference.170 It is only in 
combination with millions of other emitters that the anthropogenic 
greenhouse effect becomes a radical and potentially devastating climactic 
experiment. Plaintiffs’ dream scenario to overcome this multiple defendant 
problem would be for courts to adopt the same presumption of indivisibility 
that they do in the asbestos context, such that any significant contribution to 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions would subject a defendant to joint-
and-several liability for the entirety of plaintiff’s harm.171 Precedent in the 
pollution nuisance context exists for such an approach. To begin with, it is 
clear that contribution to a pollution nuisance above a de minimis threshold 
can give rise to damages liability or injunctive relief, notwithstanding the 
presence of numerous other contributors.172 Moreover, many courts have 
held that, where apportionment among contributors is infeasible, plaintiffs 
may hold defendants jointly and severally liable or may shift the burden of 
 
 168 See, e.g., In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 494 (N.J. 2007) (“[W]ere we to permit these 
complaints to proceed, we would stretch the concept of public nuisance far beyond recognition 
and would create a new and entirely unbounded tort antithetical to the meaning and inherent 
theoretical limitations of the tort of public nuisance.”). 
 169 See Jill D. Jacobson & Rebecca S. Herbig, Public Nuisance Law: Resistance to Expansive 
New Theories, 8 MASS TORTS 3, 5 (A.B.A. Sec. Litig., Fall, 2009) (noting that plaintiffs have used 
public nuisance theories to “evade” traditional causes of action). 
 170 On the moral philosophical implications of what I am calling the “consequentialist alibi,” 
see Jonathan Glover & M. J. Scott-Taggart, It Makes No Difference Whether or Not I Do It, 49 
PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y, SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUMES 171, 171 (1975). 
 171 See Stapleton, supra note 144, at 1013.  
 172 See Illinois ex rel. Scott v. City of Milwaukee, No. 72 C 1253, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15607, 
at *20–*22 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 1973) (“The correct rule would seem to be that any discharger who 
contributes an aliquot of a total combined discharge which causes a nuisance may be enjoined 
from continuing his discharge. Either that is true or it is impossible to enjoin point 
dischargers.”), aff’d in relevant part and rev’d in part sub nom.; Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 
F.2d 151, 177 (7th Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 451 U.S. 304, 332 (1981); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 840E (1965) (stating with respect to both private and public nuisance that 
“the fact that other persons contribute to a nuisance is not a bar to the defendant’s liability for 
his own contribution”); Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 292 n.19 (5th Cir. 2001) (gathering 
sources in support of this claim). It is important to distinguish the multiple defendant problem, 
in which a substantial contribution is likely to be adequate to support some form of liability, 
from the more basic problem of connecting plaintiffs’ harm to the phenomenon of human-
induced climate change. For the latter, courts are far less likely to adopt a substantial risk 
contribution approach and will instead retain traditional more-likely-than-not principles. 
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proof onto defendants to disaggregate their respective contributions.173 
Perhaps it was this precedent that the Second Circuit panel had in mind 
when, in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Company, the panel 
offhandedly referred to rules governing “a federal common law of nuisance 
case[s] involving air pollution, where the ambient air contains pollution from 
multiple sources and where liability is joint and several.”174 Although merely 
dicta to support the conclusion that redressability for standing purposes had 
been adequately alleged, this statement nonetheless likely sent a chill 
through defendants’ boardrooms. 
The air warms slightly for defendants when one considers the ready 
divisibility of contributions to anthropogenic climate change. Although 
greenhouse gas emissions contribute to a single global phenomenon, well-
understood metrics and methods are available to standardize the warming 
potential of different gases and to quantify any particular defendant’s 
contributions. Thus, so long as the emissions levels of a particular defendant 
can be measured, that defendant’s contribution to climate change harms also 
can be estimated. EPA’s recently adopted greenhouse gas reporting rule, 
which requires suppliers of fossil fuels or industrial greenhouse gases, 
manufacturers of vehicles and engines, and facilities that emit 25,000 metric 
tons or more per year of greenhouse gas emissions to submit annual reports 
on their emissions levels to EPA, surely eliminates any basis for plaintiffs to 
 
 173 See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1095 (5th Cir. 1973) (“Where 
several defendants are shown to have each caused some harm, the burden of proof (or burden 
of going forward) shifts to each defendant to show what portion of the harm he caused. If the 
defendants are unable to show any reasonable basis for division, they are jointly and severally 
liable for the total damages.”); Landers v. E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 248 S.W.2d 731, 734 
(Tex. 1952) (“Where the tortious acts of two or more wrongdoers join to produce an indivisible 
injury, that is, an injury which from its nature cannot be apportioned with reasonable certainty 
to the individual wrongdoers, all of the wrongdoers will be held jointly and severally liable for 
the entire damages and the injured party may proceed to judgment against any one separately 
or against all in one suit.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1965) (“Each of two or 
more persons whose tortious conduct is a legal cause of a single and indivisible harm to the 
injured party is subject to liability to the injured party for the entire harm.”); id. § 433B(2) 
(“Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to bring about harm to the 
plaintiff, and one or more of the actors seeks to limit his liability on the ground that the harm is 
capable of apportionment among them, the burden of proof as to the apportionment is upon 
each such actor.”); David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 
1765, 1790–91 (1997) (“[M]ost American courts will say that the plaintiff must apportion the 
separate damages between or among the tortfeasors when that is feasible, but that when 
apportionment is not feasible the tortfeasors should be held jointly and severally liable for the 
entire damage.” (footnote omitted)).  
  On the other hand, the Second Restatement also offers the following caveat:  
The possibility arises that there may be so large a number of actors, each of whom 
contributes a relatively small and insignificant part to the total harm, that the application 
of the rule [of joint and several liability and burden-shifting] may cause disproportionate 
hardship to defendants. Thus if a hundred factories each contribute a small, but still 
uncertain, amount of pollution to a stream, to hold each of them liable for the entire 
damage because he cannot show the amount of his contribution may perhaps be unjust.  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B cmt. e (1965). 
 174 582 F.3d 309, 349 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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claim the infeasibility of disaggregating defendants’ contributions to climate 
change going forward.175 And although historical emissions data is much 
harder to estimate, plaintiffs still have means available to undertake such 
estimations through corporate records, tax filings, government lease 
documents, and other sources. One study, for instance, concludes that as 
much as five per cent of anthropogenic CO2 emissions over the last 120 years 
can be attributed to a single oil company and its corporate predecessors.176 
In short, because of the relatively diffuse and uniform effect of 
greenhouse gas emissions and because of the possibility of estimating 
particular defendants’ emissions levels, plaintiffs do not need to rely on joint 
and several liability, burden-shifting, or other concessionary causation 
doctrines. Nor do they need to resort to market share liability, as some 
commentators have suggested.177 Under market share liability, courts 
apportion liability according to defendants’ share of the relevant product 
market, rather than more directly on their share of causal responsibility for 
plaintiffs’ harm. Courts have invoked market share liability in the 
diethylstilbestrol (DES) context in light of plaintiffs’ inability to prove which 
defendant manufactured and marketed the particular doses of DES that 
plaintiffs’ mothers ingested and that led to teratogenic harm.178 At least in 
theory, if all DES victims sued all DES manufacturers, and if all courts 
applied market share liability in the same fashion, then eventually all 
manufacturers would pay damages equal to their actual causal shares of 
responsibility. Some semblance of classical liberal tort responsibility would 
thus be preserved through the aggregate impact of the suits. Nonetheless, 
very few courts have applied the market share theory outside of the DES 
context, usually on the ground that other products and activities do not have 
the feature of generic fungibility that DES does.179 Perhaps because 
greenhouse gas emissions do seem to have that elusive quality of fungibility, 
commentators advocate application of market share liability for climate-
related harms.180 The climate change context, however, is fundamentally 
different: each emission contributes to a single global process that causes all 
harms. In such a context, several liability is the appropriate theory of 
recovery, rather than market share. 
 
 175 See Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reporting, 74 Fed. Reg. 16,448, 16,612–14 (Apr. 10, 2009) 
(to be codified at scattered sections of 40 C.F.R.). 
 176 The distinction belongs to ExxonMobil. Hunter & Salzman, supra note 3, at 1750 (quoting 
Press Release, Friends of the Earth, ExxonMobil’s Contribution to Global Warming Revealed 
(Jan. 29, 2004), http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/press_releases/exxonmobils_contribution_t_ 
28012004.html). 
 177 See Grimm, supra note 3, at 211; Maag, supra note 3, at 210–11. 
 178 Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980). 
 179 See Edwards v. A.L. Lease & Co., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 259, 262 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (market 
share liability not applicable to ABS pipe); Univ. Sys. of N.H. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 756 F. Supp. 
640, 656 (D.N.H. 1991) (asbestos not a fungible product susceptible to application of market 
share liability); Mullen v. Armstrong World Indus. Inc., 246 Cal. Rptr. 32, 35–36 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1988) (same). 
 180 See Grimm, supra note 3, at 219–21. 
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Of course, once causal contributions are disaggregated in this way, the 
problem of diluteness reappears. Tellingly, the Second Restatement offers 
this caveat regarding the multiple causation context: “although no one of the 
contributing factors may have such a predominant effect, their combined 
effect may, as it were, so dilute the effects of the actor’s negligence as to 
prevent it from being a substantial factor.”181 Do the emissions of any 
individual defendant constitute a “substantial factor” driving climate 
change? To be sure, there is remarkable market concentration in the fossil 
fuel, automobile, and electricity sectors.182 “In fact, 50 companies are 
responsible for three-quarters of the emissions from the U.S. electric power 
sector. Of these, just 18 companies are responsible for 50% of the emissions, 
and just 5 companies for 25%.”183 
By carefully selecting a group of defendants from among these high-
emitting companies, plaintiffs are somewhat able to overcome the causal 
diluteness impression. As one of the lead plaintiffs’ lawyers observed with 
respect to the defendants in Connecticut v. American Electric Power 
Company, “[a] court order requiring these five companies to reduce their 
emissions would constitute one of the single greatest reductions in GHGs 
ever effected.”184 Nevertheless, it would still be a reduction that is slight in 
comparison to the overall level of emissions. Notably, when the Supreme 
Court was faced with this feature of the climate change problem in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, the majority stressed that regulatory agencies are 
entitled to “whittle away” at a complex problem such as climate change by 
targeting only selected contributors, rather than being required to bring all 
significant sources under a control regime in one fell swoop.185 
But courts are not agencies and the common law of tort is designed to 
address discrete harms by discrete actors, rather than to “whittle away” at 
the margins of a comprehensive problem. Indeed, even if one assumed for a 
moment that national governments could be sued in tort for permitting 
greenhouse gas emitting activities within their jurisdictions—in order to 
construct a class of defendants manageable in size yet still emissions-
encompassing in scope—the problem of diluteness would remain. Historical 
responsibility for existing greenhouse gas concentrations is difficult to 
calculate, but studies suggest that at most around thirty percent of the 
 
 181 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433 cmt. d (1965). See also id. § 834 cmt. d (“When a 
person is only one of several persons participating in carrying on an activity, his participation 
must be substantial before he can be held liable for the harm resulting from it.”). 
 182 See Grossman, supra note 3, at 29–31. 
 183 See Pawa, supra note 3, at 10,238 (citing SANDRA GOODMAN ET AL., NATURAL RES. DEF. 
CTR., BENCHMARKING AIR EMISSIONS OF THE 100 LARGEST ELECTRIC POWER PRODUCERS IN THE 
UNITED STATES–2002, at 3 (2004), available at http://www.nrdc.org/air/pollution/benchmarking/ 
2002/benchmark2002_pt1.pdf)  
 184 Id. 
 185 549 U.S. 497, 524 (1997). A similar defense of incremental regulation and selective 
targeting of industries that are amenable to greenhouse gas regulation was accepted by the 
European Court of Justice, notwithstanding the argument of targeted industries that the 
principle of equal treatment under law had been violated. See Case C-127/07, Société Arcelor 
Atlantique et Lorraine v. Premier ministre, 2009 O.J. (C 44/13) 8, 8–9 (Court of Justice of the 
European Union 2008). 
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current stock is attributable to any single nation.186 Looking forward, relative 
national contributions will become even more diffuse, as China, India, 
Brazil, and other major developing countries continue to expand their 
emissions.187 Thus, even in a fanciful world of full tort liability against 
national actors, the problem of causal diluteness still looms large over 
plaintiffs’ claims. Perhaps, then, the reason that commentators turn to 
market share liability is that its logic seems to eliminate the need for any 
particular defendant to constitute a “substantial factor” in bringing about 
plaintiff’s harm. In theory, if plaintiff wishes to sue defendants representing 
only one percent of the relevant market, then she receives only one percent 
of her available recovery. Nothing within the logic of market share liability 
seems to prevent this result, or its extension to the greenhouse gas context. 
There are at least two problems with this reasoning. First, even in the 
DES context, courts have failed to accept the full implications of the market 
share logic, often requiring plaintiffs to assemble a group of defendants 
representing a “substantial percentage” of the total market.188 This 
requirement reflects the discomfort that judges have in stepping too far 
away from tort law’s classical A-hits-B framework. Second, as noted 
above,189 the climate change context poses distinct conceptual problems in 
terms of attribution, given the participation of so many actors in bringing 
about emissions other than named defendants. For instance, in its 
abandoned climate change nuisance suit, the State of California alleged that 
defendant automakers represented nine percent of the world’s CO2 
emissions.190 Not only is this an uncomfortably small share of global 
emissions for a common law court to stomach, but it also represents a 
debatable depiction of responsibility for vehicle emissions. If automakers 
are only held accountable for direct emissions from manufacturing, rather 
than also from vehicle use, then their small percentage of emissions 
becomes even smaller. 
 
 186 The distinction belongs, of course, to the United States. See World Res. Inst., 
Contributions to Global Warming: Historic Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Fossil Fuel 
Combustion, 1900–1999, http://earthtrends.wri.org/text/climate-atmosphere/map-488.html (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2011) (estimating U.S. contribution to carbon dioxide accumulation between 
1900–1999 as 30.3%, compared to a 27.7% contribution by Europe, and a 12.2% contribution by 
China, India, and other developing parts of Asia combined). 
 187 See World Res. Inst., Power Surge: Energy Use and Emissions Continue to Rise, 
http://www.wri.org/publication/content/8601 (last visited Feb. 13, 2011) (describing increasing 
fossil fuel use and CO2 emissions in developing countries). 
 188 E.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980). Indeed, only the New York 
Court of Appeals seems to have recognized that the market share logic counsels against letting 
individual defendants rebut the presumption of causal contribution by showing in any particular 
case that their products could not have been ingested by plaintiff’s mother. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly 
& Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y. 1989) (refusing to permit defendant to exculpate itself by 
showing that its product could not have caused plaintiff’s injury). 
 189 See supra text accompanying notes 174–75. 
 190 Complaint for Damages and Declaratory Judgment at 2, California v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (No. C06-05755 MJJ), available at http://ag.ca.gov/ 
newsalerts/cms06/06-082_0a.pdf. 
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Plaintiffs no doubt can point to a wealth of evidence suggesting that 
automakers deliberately steer customers toward high-emitting vehicles and 
resist legal and market efforts to advance alternative, lower-emitting 
technologies.191 On the other hand, customers are not mere putty in the 
hands of automakers: they also bear a share of responsibility for purchasing 
inefficient vehicles and for driving them in inefficient ways. In that sense, 
the greenhouse gas emission context is far more complicated than, say, the 
DES context, in which plaintiffs’ mothers simply had no idea they were 
posing a developmental risk to their infants, or the secondhand smoke 
context, in which victims plausibly seek to attribute the lion’s share of 
responsibility to the tobacco industry for marketing an addictive product 
and hiding its dangers from smokers and the public.192 Before shares of 
greenhouse gas responsibility can be calculated, we must settle on an 
appropriate principle of attribution. Just as governments internationally 
have not decided whether emissions associated with globally traded goods 
should be attributed on a production or consumption basis,193 courts 
domestically have yet to establish exactly where in the anthropogenic 
carbon cycle culpability attaches. Critically, any attempt by plaintiffs to 
narrow the class of defendants will be met by the defendants’ demand that 
other major contributors be joined as third parties (who will themselves 
also seek to implead other contributors). Quite simply, there is no way to 
avoid the extraordinary numerosity problem when it comes to greenhouse 
gas emissions.194 
A final causal difficulty for climate change plaintiffs relates to 
temporality. Most greenhouse gases are stock pollutants, capable of 
persisting in the atmosphere and warming the planet for decades, even 
centuries.195 Thus, even if plaintiffs successfully disentangle their harms from 
 
 191 Cf. Daniel Sperling et al., The Price of Regulation, 25 ACCESS, Fall 2004, at 9, 9–16, 
available at http://www.uctc.net/access/access25.pdf (exploring costs, effects, and background 
of regulatory schemes including those relating to emission controls). 
 192 See Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 449–50 (1999) (describing 
partially successful class action suit by airline flight attendants against tobacco manufacturers 
for secondhand smoke injuries). 
 193 Cf. Jiahua Pan, Jonathan Phillips & Ying Chen, China’s Balance of Emissions Embodied in 
Trade: Approaches to Measurement and Allocating International Responsibility, 24 OXFORD REV. 
ECON. POL’Y 354, 371 (2008) (estimating a thirty percent reduction in attributed emissions for 
China when greenhouse gas emissions “embodied” in traded goods are assigned to the country 
where consumption of such goods takes place). 
 194 I am indebted to Michael Gerrard for this insight. 
 195 JOHN REILLY ET AL., MIT JOINT PROGRAM ON THE SCI. & POLICY OF GLOBAL CHANGE, REPORT 
NO. 77, COMPARING GREENHOUSE GASES 1–2 (2001), available at http://dspace.mit.edu/ 
bitstream/handle/1721.1/3568/MITJPSPGC_Rpt77.pdf. This little appreciated feature of climate 
change has depressing implications for policy. Even if all anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
emissions stopped tomorrow, the atmosphere would not restore its pre-industrial concentration 
levels for one thousand years. See Susan Solomon et al., Irreversible Climate Change Due to 
Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1704, 1705 (2009). On the other hand, the 
underappreciated role of short-lived greenhouse gases such as black carbon offers some reason 
for optimism, as the significant co-benefits to be obtained from their mitigation offers potential 
to overcome some of the deadlock in international climate negotiations. See Frances C. Moore 
& Michael C. MacCracken, Lifetime Leveraging: An Approach to Achieving International 
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alternative causal explanations and successfully establish some principle of 
causal apportionment among defendants, they still must isolate precisely 
when a duty to avoid emissions attached and when their particular harm 
became reasonably foreseeable. Both of these analyses will work to shorten 
the time period within which defendants’ harmful emissions were culpably 
harmful. Both analyses will require plaintiffs to develop scientific evidence 
that not only separates anthropogenic climate change impacts from 
background drivers, but also models a counterfactual world in which 
emissions occur at historic rates right up until the moment climate 
responsibility attaches and then drop to whatever level is deemed to be 
reasonable. This exercise is necessary to ensure that plaintiffs’ harm 
resulted not merely from defendants’ conduct, but from the negligent or 
otherwise tortious aspect of defendants’ conduct. 
In the realm of products liability, courts have rarely—and usually only 
briefly—applied a standard under which manufacturers are responsible for 
product or warning defects irrespective of whether they were reasonably or 
even scientifically knowable at the time of manufacture.196 Generally 
attributed to Deans Page Keeton and John Wade, this “constructive 
knowledge” approach has the effect of making a negligence-based test for 
defectiveness into something more like a strict liability test, in light of the 
deemed irrelevance of foreseeability.197 Jane Stapleton draws attention to an 
interesting case from the United Kingdom which presented a similar 
problem outside of the products liability context.198 Plaintiffs had been 
exposed to excessive occupational noise over extended periods of 
employment, all of which contributed to hearing loss.199 Plaintiffs were 
unable, however, to precisely identify the portion of their damage that 
occurred after the point at which defendant employers became negligent by 
virtue of the reasonable foreseeability of harm.200 Rather than adopt a crude 
all or nothing approach, the trial judge instead treated the matter as one of 
rough justice for the factfinder to assess.201 Plaintiffs in the climate change 
context may need to avail themselves of either the “constructive knowledge” 
or the “rough justice” approaches, in light of the difficulty they face 
demonstrating what portion of the climate-related harm is attributable to 
culpable anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. Both doctrines are, 
however, unusual and controversial.  
 
Agreement and Effective Climate Protection Using Mitigation of Short-Lived Greenhouse Gases, 
1 INT’L. J. CLIMATE CHANGE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 42, 49 (2009). 
 196 David G. Owen, Bending Nature, Bending Law, 62 FLA. L. REV. 569, 601 n.174 (2010). 
 197 See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 8.7, at 547–49 (2d ed. 2008). Judge 
Andrews in Palsgraf utilized a similar trick when he posited that the reasonable foreseeability of 
Helen Palsgraf’s injury from the defendant railroad’s negligence in assisting fireworks-carrying 
passengers onto a train should be assessed “assum[ing] prevision of the explosion.” 162 N.E. 99, 
104–105 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
 198 See Stapleton, supra note 144, at 1021 n.34 (2009) (discussing Thompson v. Smiths 
Shiprepairers (North Shields) Ltd., [1984] 1 Q.B. 405 (U.K.)). 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. 
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D. Harm 
Even though the element of harm comes last in the hornbooks,202 it 
comes first in the minds of plaintiffs’ lawyers. For tort law, no harm 
generally means no foul.203 A basic problem for plaintiffs and their lawyers in 
the climate change context is that the most devastating impacts of 
greenhouse gas emissions are not expected to begin until later this century 
or afterward.204 Thus, in many contexts, climate change plaintiffs will want to 
seek recovery for a present risk of future harm. The circumstances under 
which courts permit such recovery, however, are quite limited. Medical 
monitoring claims in the context of toxic substance exposure present 
perhaps the best analogy.205 Although courts have rejected the notion that 
“enhanced risk” of future injury is itself a compensable harm, they have been 
friendlier to claims based on the need for medical surveillance.206 Plaintiffs 
might similarly contend that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have 
created a need for adaptation planning as a precautionary expenditure in 
advance of climate change’s worst impacts.207 Individualized assessments of 
climate change vulnerability and response needs are now being undertaken 
at all levels of government and increasingly also by the private sector, often 
at the behest of their insurers.208 Such expenses might be characterized as 
the reasonable and foreseeable consequence of climate change defendants’ 
risk-enhancing activities, just as medical monitoring costs have been so 
characterized in the toxic exposure context. 
Courts are unlikely to buy the analogy, however. To begin with, some 
courts have limited medical monitoring recovery to those risks “for which a 
medical test for early detection exists . . . and which test has been prescribed 
by a qualified physician according to contemporary scientific principles.”209 
Despite the importance and sincerity of their activities, the community of 
experts involved in climate change adaptation planning do not yet have the 
level of experience and methodological refinement—not to mention 
epistemic authority within litigation—that the medical profession does.210 
 
 202 See, e.g., JOHN L. DIAMOND, LAWRENCE C. LEVINE & M. STUART MADDEN, UNDERSTANDING 
TORTS, at ix–xvii (3d ed. 2008); EDWARD J. KIONKA, TORTS, at vii–x (3d ed. 2002). 
 203 See DIAMOND, LEVINE & MADDEN, supra note 202, at 215. 
 204 Drew Shindell, Estimating the Potential for Twenty-First Century Sudden Climate 
Change, 365 PHILANTHROPIC TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 2675, 2675 (2007). 
 205 Daniel A. Farber, Tort Law in the Era of Climate Change, Katrina, and 9/11: Exploring 
Liability for Extraordinary Risks, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1075, 1097 & n.72 (2009). As Dan Farber 
notes, the case of “stigma damages,” in which plaintiffs seek compensation for diminution in 
property values on account of the fear of harm from pollution or other nuisances, also offers a 
useful analogy. Id. at 1097 n.71. 
 206 For the pioneering opinion adopting these two positions, see Ayers v. Township of 
Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 297–304 (N.J. 1987). 
 207 Daniel A. Farber, Adapting to Climate Change: Who Should Pay, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. 
L. 1, 2 (2007). 
 208 Ruhl, supra note 6, at 418. 
 209 Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 979 (Utah 1993). 
 210 See Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential Role of State 
Common-Law Public Trust Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. 781, 808–09 (2010). 
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Second, some courts require plaintiffs to demonstrate that “as a proximate 
result of the exposure, plaintiff has a significantly increased risk of 
contracting a serious latent disease.”211 Such a requirement seems to 
incorporate all of the causal attribution difficulties described above, as 
plaintiffs can identify few if any actors below the level of national 
governments that can plausibly be described as significantly increasing the 
risk of anthropogenic climate change. Third, some courts also require 
“plaintiffs to show not only that their exposure to toxic substances is greater 
than normal background levels, but that the increased risk of injury from 
such exposure warrants medical monitoring against future illness beyond 
that which is recommended for everyone.”212 Much of climate change 
adaptation planning will involve precautionary measures that may be 
difficult to distinguish from ordinary good governance,213 just as some toxic 
risk health screening is indistinguishable from good preventative medicine. 
Thus, a requirement similar to the “special medical monitoring” rule might 
preclude recovery in the climate change context.  
Fourth, several courts have rejected the medical monitoring theory 
altogether, often citing concern over increases in the number of prospective 
tort plaintiffs and the possibility that limited defendant funds will be 
diverted away from presently injured plaintiffs.214 Just as medical monitoring 
awards could easily exhaust available funds for presently injured victims of 
toxic substance exposure, recovery of anticipated climate change expenses 
by states could quickly bankrupt whichever industries are held responsible 
for adaptation planning costs. Finally, to the extent that governmental 
plaintiffs seek compensation for anticipated rises in public health and safety 
expenditures rather than more directly for harm to their proprietary 
holdings, the economic loss rule might pose an independent barrier to 
recovery, just as it has in public nuisance litigation against handgun 
manufacturers and subprime mortgage lenders.215 In short, the “climate 
monitoring” approach to future injury faces a number of obstacles for 
plaintiffs. Instead, plaintiffs seem best advised to identify presently realized 
injuries and to connect them to the ongoing nuisance of climate change, 
hoping to obtain in the process the holy grail of injunctive relief to address 
 
 211 Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of the Army, 696 A.2d 137, 145 (Pa. 1997); see also 
Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 823 (Cal. 1993) (citing as relevant factors 
“the relative increase in the plaintiff’s chances of developing a disease as a result of the 
exposure, when compared to (a) plaintiff’s chances of developing the disease had he or she 
not been exposed, and (b) the chances of the members of the public at large of developing 
the disease”). 
 212 Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of the Army, 55 F.3d 827, 846 n.8 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 1071 (1996). 
 213 See Faber, supra note 207, at 7, 19. 
 214 See Hinton ex rel. Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So.2d 827, 831 (Ala. 2001); Wood v. Wyeth-
Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849, 857 (Ky. 2002); see also Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 
521 U.S. 424, 435–36, 442 (1997) (rejecting an upfront lump sum payment of medical monitoring 
costs to plaintiff with no symptoms because—among other reasons—the payment might 
deprive those injured in the future of an adequate remedy). 
 215 See City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 513, 526 (N.D. Ohio 
2009); City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1143 (Ill. 2004). 
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future harms.216 Of course, as noted throughout this Part, that path faces 
numerous obstacles of its own. 
III. CLIMATE CHANGE AS TORT REFORM 
Make no mistake: a conceivable set of arguments on behalf of climate 
change tort plaintiffs does exist. The problem, however, is that the winning 
scenario for most climate-related harms requires a court to stretch in 
plaintiffs’ direction at nearly every stage of the traditional tort analysis: duty 
would have to encompass “negligence in the air,” rather than more 
particularized relations of responsibility; nuisance would have to be 
interpreted as an absolute protection against significant invasions, 
irrespective of social welfare balancing; actual cause would have to 
embrace—at long last—a probabilistic, risk-enhancement conception of 
causation; exceptional measures of apportionment would have to be 
invoked to address a multiple defendant problem of unprecedented 
magnitude; proximate cause would have to be interpreted such that the 
scope of foreseeable harm from greenhouse gas emissions both tracks 
projections from climate models that stand at the very forefront of scientific 
inquiry and, in many cases, applies retroactively as a form of imputed 
knowledge tantamount to strict liability; and harm would have to be 
expanded to include much more by way of anticipatory injury than courts 
currently recognize. 
Judges are unlikely to follow plaintiffs down this gauntlet. Nevertheless, 
the very attempt to run it may yield benefits for the tort system. As this Part 
argues, the effort to fit the mother of all collective action problems into the 
traditional paradigm of tort reveals much about how that paradigm more 
generally needs to shift. In many respects, this shift will be a continuation of 
trends that began last century, but were pulled up short before their logical 
completion. Broadly speaking, American law evolved during the twentieth 
century from an individualized ex post reparative modality to a systemic ex 
ante planning one.217 Coinciding with the rise of statistical methods in fields 
such as public health and business management, this modality exerted 
obvious and important influences on administrative agencies. To some 
extent, tort law went along for the ride during this transformation.218 As the 
 
 216 See Miotke v. City of Spokane, 678 P.2d 803, 817, 821–22 (Wash. 1984) (upholding 
issuance of injunction against future water pollution discharges where plaintiffs adequately 
demonstrated present, albeit relatively minor injuries), overruled on other grounds by Blue Sky 
Advocates v. State, 727 P.2d 644, 648–49 (Wash. 1986). 
 217 See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 74 (1984); see also WITT, supra 
note 7, at 139–40 (“Statistical thinking is a remarkably recent development in Western thought. 
The word ‘statistics’ itself, which derives from the word ‘state’ and describes the science of 
gathering facts bearing on the condition of the state, did not appear in English until the late 
eighteenth century.”). 
 218 Indeed, the effort by tort jurists, labor organizers, business managers, and others to 
grapple with the industrial-accident crisis might be said to have instigated the transformation. 
See WITT, supra note 7, at 5 (observing that “the industrial-accident crisis introduced to the 
American legal system new ideas and institutions organized around risk, security, and the 
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paradigmatic tort shifted from intentional battery to accidental injury, judges 
and academics began to think of tort law as more than simply a means for 
affording private redress to victims of civil wrongs. First legal realists and 
then legal economists came to conceive of tort law largely in instrumental 
terms, as a device for deterring socially undesirable conduct.219 Attention 
moved from a focus on particular actions between particular parties (e.g., 
A hits B) to a focus on activities with more general and potentially harmful 
impacts (e.g., manufacturing automobiles, marketing pharmaceuticals, and 
shipping toxic chemicals).220 Although courts never fully surrendered to an 
instrumental view of tort law or a statistical conception of injury, the basic 
need to acknowledge these modes of analysis manifested itself in 
numerous doctrinal changes. Indeed, by the end of the twentieth century, 
the public law understanding of tort had become so influential that a neo-
traditionalist literature emerged with the aim of restoring the field’s 
classical liberal framing.221 
If neo-traditionalists are right that tort law has lost its mooring, then 
climate change suits will only underscore their point. Alternatively, if judges 
and academics continue to view tort law at least partially in instrumental 
terms—which they undoubtedly will222—then climate change suits may have 
the salutary effect of fostering judicial recognition of just how complex and 
interrelated social, economic, and environmental systems are. Judges may 
learn to see the world through an ecological lens, just as they have come to 
see it at least partially through an economic one. Such a development should 
be welcomed, for despite the intellectual and practical success of law and 
 
actuarial categories of insurance—ideas and institutions that to this day remain at the heart of 
much of our law”).  
 219 See ACKERMAN, supra note 217, at 52 (“Instead of sifting the facts in search of the cause of the 
trouble, the lawyer-economist urges a conception of causation that recognizes how a multiplicity of 
factors, operating over a lengthy period of time, contribute to our legal discontents.”). 
 220 See id. 
 221 See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 70, at 596; John C.P. Goldberg, Rethinking Injury and 
Proximate Cause, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1315, 1315–16 (2003); Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 
70, at 344; Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 61, at 736; Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, 
Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 754 (2003); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and 
Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 98 (1998). In addition to the neo-traditionalists, 
mention also must be made of corrective justice theorists who have long argued that 
instrumentalist welfarism does not provide a satisfactory positive or, in the case of some 
authors, normative account of tort law. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: 
IN DEFENSE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 27–28 (2001); JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS 
AND WRONGS 198 (1992); ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 24 (1999); 
ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 4–5 (1995); Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of 
Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 53, 72 (David G. Owen ed., 
1995); Arthur Ripstein & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Corrective Justice in an Age of Mass Torts, in 
PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 214, 245 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001); Jules L. Coleman, The 
Structure of Tort Law, 97 YALE L.J. 1233, 1240–41 (1988) (reviewing WILLIAM M. LANDES & 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987) and STEVEN SHAVELL, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987)); Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort 
Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449, 450 (1992); Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 485, 525 (1989). 
 222 See Schwartz, supra note 72, at 1834. 
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economics, the movement has not lived up to its ambition of providing a 
comprehensive framework for analyzing the social welfare effects of laws 
and regulations. Most critically, economic evaluation of common law rules 
and regulatory policies has tended to consist only of partial equilibrium 
analysis, in which major components of society’s systems are held 
constant, save for whatever particular rule or policy is under inspection.223 
In part, this approach has been driven by methodological constraints, as 
more dynamic and comprehensive general equilibrium analyses are 
difficult and costly to undertake. In addition, however, the preference for 
partial equilibrium analysis has been tied to the conservative view that 
laws and institutions function best when they have withstood the test of 
time and that, accordingly, society should resist radical or wholesale 
change. Practitioners of law and economics implement this view by 
evaluating policy proposals piecemeal, examining each for marginal social 
welfare improvements over a baseline case of business as usual. The 
baseline case itself is rarely critically examined. 
This marginalist orientation has two important limitations in the 
context of contemporary environmental, health, and safety threats. First, the 
partial equilibrium framing tends as a practical matter to miss important 
welfare consequences that would be more apparent from a vantage point 
that assumes complex interrelations among systems. For instance, on the 
conventional economic account, liability for shipping toxic chemicals by rail 
through residential neighborhoods is treated as a simple matter of weighing 
the direct health and cleanup costs of a spill against the expense of 
preventing it.224 From a more dynamic and systemic perspective, however, 
the costs of a toxic release would be expanded to include the erosion of 
social capital and the unraveling of housing prices, school quality, and other 
indicators of well-being that often accompany such disasters.225 Likewise, the 
risk of a toxic release occurring would include not only well-characterized 
engineering, weather, and human operational factors, but also uncertain 
variables such as the possibility of terrorist acts.226 Even seemingly well-
understood factors such as toxicity would be accompanied by an awareness 
that unforeseen exposure pathways, synergistic interactions, disease 
mechanisms, vulnerable subpopulations, and other unpredictable features 
make toxic risk assessment inherently uncertain.227 
 
 223 KYSAR, supra note 95, at 21–23. 
 224 See Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1179–81 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 225 See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Abnormally Dangerous: Inequality Dissonance 
and the Making of Tort Law, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011). 
 226 See Hazardous Materials: Enhancing Rail Transportation Safety and Security for 
Hazardous Materials Shipments, 73 Fed. Reg. 72,182, 72,191 (Nov. 26, 2008) (to be codified at 49 
C.F.R. pts. 172, 174) (detailing reasons why conventional cost-benefit analysis cannot be applied 
to homeland security rail safety regulations, including difficulty of assessing the risk and 
consequence of terrorist action). 
 227 See generally PRESIDENT’S CANCER PANEL, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS.,  REDUCING ENVIRONMENTAL CANCER RISK: WHAT WE CAN DO NOW (2010), 
available at http://deainfo.nci.nih.gov/advisory/pcp/annualReports/pcp08-09rpt/PCP_Report_08-
09_508.pdf (discussing the effect of various environmental risk factors on cancer rates). The 
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Second, the partial equilibrium framing is only able to offer marginal 
efficiency improvements to a given status quo, rather than an entirely 
different imagined baseline from which to seek such marginal 
improvements.228 This limitation is significant because in some policy areas 
such as climate change, truly transformative alterations to the status quo are 
required. This analytical point is critical: when judged according to 
conventional economic analysis, such transformations will involve steps 
along the way that appear to be in-efficient. That is, in order to realize 
entirely new systems of energy, housing, transportation, manufacturing, 
waste disposal, forestry, agriculture, and water treatment—all of which 
depend at present on unsustainable levels of greenhouse gas emissions229—
societies will need to adopt policies that seem welfare-decreasing when 
evaluated according to cost-benefit data that are derived from present 
orderings. One way of understanding this second point is to imagine the 
pursuit of social welfare maximization as being akin to climbing a 
mountain. Partial equilibrium analysis offers narrow technical advice on 
how best to climb that mountain. Through disciplined calculation, each 
proposed step is evaluated to determine whether it results in a gain of 
elevation.230 Nowhere in the analysis, however, is the question posed, “Are 
we on the right mountain?”231 
Of course, for reasons of institutional competence and political 
legitimacy, no one should expect common law courts to direct us to the right 
mountain. Such wholesale changes in response to climate change will come, 
if at all, from legislative and regulatory programs that ultimately join the 
New Deal and the Second Reconstruction in terms of their transformative 
impact on the American legal, economic, and social order. Nevertheless, as 
this Part details, the effort to assess the validity of climate-related tort claims 
may have significant secondary effects for the common law, encouraging 
judges to view less extreme fact settings as more amenable to tort resolution 
 
fact that the “benefits” side of an activity’s balance sheet might also have uncertainties and 
overlooked systemic dynamics simply underscores the limitation of partial equilibrium 
efficiency analysis in the face of large-scale harms that are connected to foundational 
technologies and activities. Unable to trace costs and benefits through to a systemic resting 
point—and unable to agree upon a neutral value metric for assessing their weight—we instead rely 
on unarticulated assumptions about the valence and magnitude of uncounted costs and benefits. 
See generally KYSAR, supra note 95, at 73–74 (discussing the relative ease of identifying toxicity 
effects on one species, but the difficulty in using nonlinear, dynamic factors and the irreducible 
uncertainty of such analyses). 
 228 See also James M. Anderson, The Missing Theory of Variable Selection in the Economic 
Analysis of Tort Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 255 (2007) (discussing the variability of inputs in 
assessment of negligence). 
 229 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 
1990–2008, at ES–1 to –2, ES–7 to –15 (2010). 
 230 Even on this score, the partial equilibrium approach faces insuperable obstacles. See R.G. 
Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, in 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11, 11–12 
(1956). As anyone who has climbed an actual mountain knows, the surest route to the top is not 
the one that ascends with every step. 
 231 The analogy could be extended: “Will this mountain offer the most inspirational view? 
How many of us will fit at the top? Is the top really a cliff?” 
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than they currently do. It is possible, of course, that these secondary effects 
will occur in precisely the opposite direction. Judges, in other words, might 
retrench even further onto a narrow, classical liberal conception of tort law 
in the face of extraordinary conceptual and empirical challenges to that 
conception posed by climate change. They would do so, however, at the 
long-term risk of the social relevance and viability of the tort system. To the 
extent that this Part appears to offer prediction, then, it should be 
understood as an exercise in hopeful or aspirational prediction. Many 
possible futures lie ahead for tort law and for the notions of duty and 
responsibility embodied within it. The one sketched here is not only 
possible, but desirable. 
A. Duty/Proximate Cause 
Duty within the common law of tort must be attentive to changing 
circumstances while remaining stable enough to honor private expectations. 
At times, this balancing act reaches a crisis point. As John Witt has 
powerfully illustrated, common law judges came under tremendous strain 
during the late 19th century, as shocking rates of injury and death among 
industrial workers were difficult to square with prevailing tort doctrines and 
the free labor ideology that supported them.232 The romantic ideal of freely 
bargaining, self-possessed workers helped to normatively underwrite tort 
defenses such as assumption of risk and the fellow servant rule.233 Yet, as the 
American workplace changed dramatically in character, those same 
doctrines seemed to become primarily a shield for capital owners rather 
than an enabler of autonomy for labor.234 Although judges did experiment 
with new principles and practices for redressing the industrial carnage that 
came before them, they ultimately lost out to the systems of workers’ 
compensation that proliferated throughout state legislatures, largely 
displacing the common law of tort, workers’ cooperative movements, and 
other institutional responses to the accident crisis.235 As Witt argues, part of 
tort law’s adaptive disadvantage was its inability to assimilate new social 
scientific ways of apprehending the industrial landscape.236 While classical 
tort doctrines seemed capable of rationalizing away any individual case of 
workplace suffering, aggregated accident data presented instead a policy 
problem of historically unprecedented magnitude.237 “[I]n the face of such 
statistical regularities, classical tort law’s attempt to assign fault and 
responsibility through individualized inquiry into each work-accident case 
seemed beside the point.”238 
 
 232 See WITT, supra note 7, at 7–8. 
 233 See id. at 13. 
 234 Id. at 64–65. 
 235 See id. at 69. 
 236 See id. at 44. 
 237 Id. at 2–3. 
 238 Id. at 144. 
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In contrast to this experience, common law judges showed nimbleness 
in responding to the changing character of the American consumer 
marketplace, perhaps in part because of lessons they learned from the 
industrial accident crisis. Starting with Cardozo’s storied opinion in 
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company,239 and continuing until the liability 
counterrevolution of the 1980s, judges unabashedly and creatively forged a 
new body of products liability law to respond to the rise of a mass consumer 
marketplace.240 Rather than remain locked in a contractual ideology that 
seemed increasingly out of touch with the realities of commodity 
distribution, judges instead set aside traditional doctrines such as the privity 
barrier, opening the door to a new body of case law that articulated the 
duties manufacturers and marketers owe to all foreseeable users of their 
goods.241 The same judicially conservative impulses that prevailed in the 
context of workplace torts seemed to have little force when it came to 
product-caused accidents.242 Whatever its normative merits, this products 
liability revolution had the effect of protecting the common law from the 
kind of wholesale displacement that that had occurred in the case of worker 
injury. Eventually consumer-focused regulatory agencies would develop on 
the state and federal level, but—with the notable exception of the United 
States Food and Drug Administration—these agencies pose little if any 
threat to the dominance of the common law as overseer of product safety.243  
Like industrialization and mass marketing in their respective eras, 
climate change ill fits the existing tort paradigm and its underlying ideology. 
Consider, for instance, the familiar framing of environmental harm as a 
collective action problem. For the better part of two thousand years, this 
lens has influenced and at times dominated Western understanding of why 
certain resources—such as the finite capacity of the earth to absorb 
greenhouse gases without serious repercussion—are prone to tragic 
overuse.244 Unless individual self-interest can be constrained through some 
 
 239 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
 240 See WITT, supra note 7, at 208. 
 241 William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 
YALE L.J. 1099, 1100 (1960). 
 242 See William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (1953) (“A little more 
than a century ago Lord Abinger foresaw that ‘the most absurd and outrageous consequences, 
to which I can see no limit, would ensue,’ if it should ever be held that one party to a contract 
was under any obligation to anyone but his immediate promisee. All the progeny of MacPherson 
. . . have now given the lie to those words in the case of the manufacturer who sells his goods 
. . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
 243 C.f. Judith S. Kaye & Kenneth I. Weissman, Interactive Judicial Federalism: Certified 
Questions in New York, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 373, 399 (2000) (noting that certification of questions 
from federal court to state court is common in products liability cases because products liability is 
“dominated by state common law and arises frequently in federal diversity cases”). 
 244 See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 2–3 (1990) (tracing the intellectual origins of the tragedy of the commons to 
Aristotle); see also Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change 9 
(The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5095, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1494833 (“The applicability of the 
conventional theory [of collective action] is considered to be so obvious by many scholars that 
few questions have been raised about whether this is the best theoretical foundation for making 
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mechanism, such as law or social norms, the logic of the commons dilemma 
is inexorable: “burn ‘em if you got ‘em, since the other guy is surely going to 
burn his.” In their essay on climate change justice, Eric Posner and Cass 
Sunstein repeatedly return to this consequentialist alibi as an argument 
against the imposition of a legal duty: “[i]t is not negligent to fail to 
contribute to a public good if not enough others are doing similarly, so that 
the public good would not be created even if one did contribute.”245 With 
more subtlety, Keith Hylton attempts to distinguish between public goods—
for which the government must compensate individuals when they are 
required to contribute—and public harms—for which the government may 
impose nuisance liability against individual contributors.246 The problem, of 
course, is determining which is which. Are the Connecticut defendants 
creating a public harm when they emit greenhouse gases that contribute to 
climate change or are they merely failing to preserve the public good of 
atmospheric stability? What are the relevant public goods in Kivalina—the 
electricity grid and the highway transportation system, in which case 
plaintiffs would seem to be bearing a disproportionate burden for the goods’ 
provision, or the atmosphere’s limited absorptive capacity, in which case 
defendants would seem to be unfairly saddled by nuisance liability? 
Expectations about resource ownership and socially appropriate behavior 
must drive the public good/public harm dichotomy in order for it to do 
meaningful conceptual work, yet the task of law frequently is to subject 
those very expectations to fresh inquiry. 
Whatever its logical force and empirical veracity, the consequentialist 
alibi fails to provide hope and guidance in a warming world. Its seeming 
undeniability now clouds our thinking. Posner and Sunstein, for instance, 
repeatedly claim that they are analyzing climate change through notions of 
corrective justice, rather than welfarism.247 Yet their conclusions at critical 
stages are driven by distinctively welfarist habits of thought: “As long as the 
costs [of emissions] are being toted up, the benefits should be as well, and 
 
real progress toward substantially reducing greenhouse gas emissions and taking other actions 
to reduce the threat of massive harm brought about by climate change.”). 
 245 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 35, at 19. 
 246 Keith N. Hylton, When Should We Prefer Tort Law to Environmental Regulation?, 41 
WASHBURN L. J. 515, 533–34 (2002). More specifically, Hylton fuses Justice Scalia’s approach to 
regulatory takings jurisprudence with a public choice model of the political process. Just as 
regulators may limit private property use when background nuisance principles would afford 
relief, courts may intervene through nuisance when the political process fails to do so. The 
recent Supreme Court case of Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department. of 
Environmental. Protection, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2009), offers a challenging context to test Hylton’s 
theory, as the majority indicated keen interest in developing the concept of judicial takings. Id. 
at 2602. If both regulatory and judicial takings are defined in terms of one another, which will 
provide a fulcrum for analysis? Like his attempt in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 
U.S. 1003 (1992), to find something “magical in the reasoning of judges long dead,” id. at 1055 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting), Justice Scalia’s answer in Stop the Beach Renourishment is the 
unsatisfactory and historically inaccurate one that courts in the founding era “had no power to 
‘change’ the common law.” Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2606. 
 247 Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L. J. 1565, 1592 & 
n.122 (2008).  
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used to offset the requirements of corrective justice.”248 As long as welfare 
consequences are used to “offset” alternative moral theories, there will be no 
alternative moral theories. At bottom of the climate change dilemma is a 
pessimistic moral imagination. Unable at the global level to coordinate 
behavior through law or shared social norms, individuals instead expect 
the worst from others and thereby bring out the worst in themselves. 
Nations do the same: afraid to unilaterally incur mitigation costs, they 
instead lock themselves into an irresolvable game of greenhouse gas 
chicken. A different sort of moral imagination might anticipate an upward 
spiral from acts of leadership and self-sacrifice, one that brings out the 
best in all.249 Obviously, this hope can be proven wrong, as realists 
repeatedly remind, but there is honor in a sucker’s payoff when the stakes 
are these. As Solzhenitsyn said, “Let the lie come into the world, even 
dominate the world, but not through me.”250  
Moral imagination might respond in a second way to the view that 
individual contributions to a commons dilemma are of inconsequential 
effect. The theoretical possibility of climate change tipping points helps 
actors to envision the impact of their emissions. If there do exist greenhouse 
gas concentration thresholds beyond which runaway climate change 
scenarios may occur—caused, for instance, by a massive dieback of the 
Amazon, melting of the Antarctic or Greenland ice sheets, or release of 
massive stores of methane from the ocean floor251—then individual emitters 
may have to live with the possibility that their contribution was the one that 
pushed the planet over the edge. It is not that these tipping point scenarios 
actually undermine the commons dilemma aspect of the climate change 
problem, but they do help make tangible the way in which discrete 
contributions to the problem matter, even though they appear only as 
proverbial drops in a bucket. Common law precedent for such an exercise 
exists in the asbestos context, where courts treat every significant exposure 
 
 248 Id. at 1594. 
 249 A prime, albeit contested, historical example being the abolitionist movement. See 
Seymour Drescher, Capitalism and Slavery After Fifty Years, in 18 SLAVERY & ABOLITION 212, 219 
(1997) (reviewing literature on the role of economic, as opposed to moral suasion, factors in 
driving the British abolition of slavery). 
 250 Glover & Scott-Taggart, supra note 170, at 184 (quoting Solzhenitsyn’s Nobel lecture). 
Glover, it should be noted, goes on to critique Solzhenitsyn’s moral romanticism. In a recent 
book, I defend approaches such as Solzhenitsyn’s for environmental law—not on the basis of 
their absolutism—but on the basis that alternative approaches grounded exclusively in logic 
and empiricism simply cannot resolve many of the fundamental issues that lie at the heart of 
problems such as climate change. See KYSAR, supra note 95, at 71–73. Writers such as Glover, 
Posner, and Sunstein essentially assume an absence of any moral or legal duty and then try to 
identify logical conditions under which one might arise. Id. at 54–55. A different philosophical 
tradition begins with the assumption that individual subjectivity does not exist prior to ethical 
obligation. From this perspective, we come to be already under a duty of care to respond to 
suffering. This tradition deserves reconsideration, if only because it seems to offer motivational 
resources in the climate change context that alternatives lack. See id. at 32–34. 
 251 On tipping point scenarios, see the extremely useful overview, Timothy M. Lenton et al., 
Tipping Elements in the Earth’s Climate System, 105 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 1786 (2008), 
available at http://www.pnas.org/content/105/6/1786.full.pdf+html. 
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to asbestos as if it were a factual cause of plaintiff’s cancer, even though 
scientists are unsure whether the underlying biological mechanism for 
asbestos-related cancers is a threshold one.252 Because we do know that 
catastrophic thresholds loom with respect to climate change,253 the 
imaginative exercise may be even more appropriate.  
Moral imagination also is required to conceive of responsibility in terms 
that extend beyond the presentist and individualistic orientation of classical 
liberalism. Posner and Sunstein repeatedly claim that “standard ideas about 
distributive or corrective justice poorly fit the climate change problem.”254 
Their concern about fit with corrective justice principles stems from the 
facts that many of the individuals responsible for the existing stock of 
greenhouse gas concentrations are long dead, that differences in emissions 
levels within nations are obscured by per capita data, and that individuals 
will experience wildly varying welfare consequences from climate change 
even within the same region. In such a context, the requirement that justice 
be cashed out in individual terms poses a serious obstacle to the design and 
implementation of any system of responsibility and redress. One response, 
then, is to maintain the conceptual framework for corrective justice intact 
and conclude that the climate change problem simply falls outside its 
purview, since “corrective justice requires an identity between the victim 
and the claimant.”255 A different approach is to try to build new frameworks 
for the analysis of justice, ones that are commensurate with the temporal 
and geographic scale of the problem. Tort law is unlikely to be the venue 
within which such a project unfolds, but it may not be immune from the 
project’s influence. 
Consider in this respect the case of Barasich v. Columbia Gulf 
Transmission Company,256 in which a putative class of Louisiana landowners 
sued several oil and gas companies for exploration, pipeline, and shipping 
activities that left residents more vulnerable to property damage from wind 
 
 252 Stapleton, supra note 144, at 1024–26. 
 253 See Kirsten Zickfeld et al., Expert Judgments About Transient Climate Response to 
Alternative Future Trajectories of Radiative Forcing, 107 PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI. 12,451, 12,455 
(2010), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2010/06/24/0908906107.full.pdf (reporting 
results of a survey of fourteen leading climate change scientists, the overwhelming majority of 
whom believe that a climate change tipping point is more likely than not to occur before the 
year 2200 under IPCC high emissions scenarios). 
 254 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 247, at 1573. Their concern about fit with distributive 
justice principles stems from the fact that wealthy nations at present make only meager 
resource transfers to non-wealthy nations. Thus, for Posner and Sunstein, “it remains puzzling 
why wealthy nations should be willing to protect poor nations from the risks of . . . climate 
change . . . while not being willing to give them resources with which they can set their own 
priorities.” Id. at 1585. The puzzle, however, perhaps lies in the assumption that distributive 
justice is only concerned with monetary resources. 
 255 Id. at 1595; see also id. at 1572 (“blame must ordinarily be apportioned to individuals”); id. 
at 1602 (dismissing “collectivist habits of thinking”); David Weisbach, Responsibility for Climate 
Change, By the Numbers 25 (U. Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 
448, 2009) (“Standard notions of responsibility for bad acts usually reject collective 
responsibility; we have to assign responsibility to particular individuals.”). 
 256 467 F. Supp. 2d 676 (E.D. La. 2006). 
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and storm surge during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.257 Unlike Comer v. 
Murphy Oil, plaintiffs in Barasich faced no necessity of causally linking 
specific hurricanes to the phenomenon of climate change.258 Instead, their 
allegation of harm was tightly and directly linked to defendants’ activity in 
reducing and impairing protective marshland areas along the Louisiana 
coast.259 Nevertheless, in dismissing the plaintiffs’ trespass and nuisance 
claims, the court emphasized that such obligations traditionally only apply 
between “neighbors,” which the court construed in narrow terms.260 
Similarly, with respect to plaintiffs’ negligence claim, the court determined 
that under Louisiana law, defendants owed no duty of care to remote 
plaintiffs to avoid risk-enhancing alterations of coastal areas.261 Despite the 
apparent expansiveness of the Louisiana code provision on negligence—in 
sweeping terms, the provision states that “[e]very act whatever of man that 
causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair 
it”—the court held that defendants were under no duty of care with respect 
to “these hundreds of thousands of plaintiffs to protect them from the 
results of coastal erosion allegedly caused by operators that were physically 
and proximately remote from plaintiffs or their property.”262 
What can account for these holdings, other than visceral revulsion at 
the sheer magnitude of the claimed liability as in Strauss v. Belle Realty Co.? 
Despite rejecting defendants’ political question arguments, the trial judge 
nevertheless seemed driven by a concern that the weight of the case moved 
it from the domain of tort to politics, from adjudication to regulation. After 
all, the judge concluded her opinion by inviting plaintiffs to re-plead with a 
more narrow and carefully constituted class: “By all accounts, coastal 
erosion is a serious problem in south Louisiana. [P]erhaps a more focused, 
less ambitious lawsuit between parties who are proximate in time and 
space, with a less attenuated connection between the defendant’s conduct 
and the plaintiff’s loss, would be the way to test their theory.263  
This equivocation was odd. The plaintiffs’ case was premised on the 
ecological consequences of oil and gas operations in the Gulf. They 
alleged that “as a result of the defendants’ operations . . . , over one million 
acres of marshland have already been destroyed, and millions more 
essentially decimated, depriving inland communities, such as the City of 
New Orleans and St. Bernard Parish, of their natural protection from 
hurricane winds and accompanying storm surge.”264  
Thus, if the judge was willing to accept the ecological mechanism by 
which plaintiffs’ harms allegedly occurred, then the reach of defendants’ 
responsibility should be determined by the reliability of storm surge models, 
 
 257 Id. at 678.  
 258 See supra text accompanying notes 160–64 (discussing dim prospects for the Comer v. 
Murphy Oil plaintiffs in this regard). 
 259 Barasich, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 679–80. 
 260 Id. at 690. 
 261 Id. at 693. 
 262 Id. at 690, 693. 
 263 Id. at 695. 
 264 Id. at 679. 
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not by abstract principles of proximity and remoteness. Put differently, if the 
judge was willing to find a duty of care with respect to some landowners but 
not others, then her ruling would represent an unexplained and only half-
hearted embrace of the lessons of ecology. 
The fundamental lesson of ecology is, of course, that everything is 
connected; we are all “neighbors” in an environmental sense, whatever our 
classical liberal conceptions may hold. Hence, law’s intimate embrace of 
territoriality—and tort law’s dependence on some notion of proximity—both 
are severely tested by climate change awareness. Some degree of 
retrenchment is naturally to be expected: witness, for instance, the strong 
reassertion of Westphalian national sovereignty and backing away from 
comprehensive global climate regulation that occurred at Copenhagen in 
2009.265 Likewise, notwithstanding modern expansions, the concepts of duty 
and proximate causation in tort law remain substantially animated by a 
classical liberal worldview in which individuals are deemed free to pursue 
activities unless they impose harms upon identified victims that bear some 
geographic, market, or other relational nexus to the actor. As commentators 
have noted, certain categories of harm such as emotional distress or pure 
economic loss are problematic on this account because they reveal us to be 
embedded in systems capable of spreading wide the harmful impacts of our 
behavior.266 Tort law manages these conceptual threats by recognizing only 
particularly salient and limited categories of emotional distress and economic 
loss recovery, and by otherwise preserving the classical liberal fiction that we 
are atomistic and isolated from one another, save for our occasional physical 
collisions. Climate change deals a final blow to this fiction by making the 
causation of physical harm utterly independent of collision or, indeed, of any 
other familiar understanding of proximity. By comparison, the duty alleged in 
Barasich seems non-controversial, even mundane.267 
Law in the twenty-first century will be preoccupied with the problem of 
instilling responsibility within complex networks. The challenge for tort law 
will be particularly acute, as much of tort law works out the idea that 
responsibility needs to be confined, rather than located in the first place. 
Individuals are thought to have limited capacity to care for others, not least 
because of their imperfect abilities to predict and prevent harmful 
consequences of action. The various uses of foreseeability in tort law 
respond to this condition, providing cues to individuals to help them 
prioritize their limited investments in the prevention of harm.268 Not only 
practical, this rule also is said to reflect principled notions of fairness:  
 
 265 Key Powers Reach Compromise at Climate Summit, BBC NEWS, Dec. 19, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8421935.stm (last visted Feb. 13, 2011). 
 266 E.g., Mark Geistfeld, Negligence, Compensation, and the Coherence of Tort Law, 91 GEO. 
L.J. 585, 614–15 (2003).  
 267 See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F. Supp. 2d 644, 697 (E.D. La. 2009) 
(finding that actions by the Army Corps of Engineers over several decades in negligently 
constructing and maintaining the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet proximately caused a portion of 
plaintiffs’ harm, notwithstanding the much stronger causal contribution of Hurricane Katrina). 
 268 See Mark Geistfeld, The Analytics of Duty: Medical Monitoring and Related Forms of 
Economic Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1921, 1927 (2002) (“The relational nature of negligence, embodied 
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The basic idea is that it is unfair to impose liability for an injury unless the 
defendant may cogently be said to be responsible for bringing about the injury. 
D ’ s  conduct being a cause in fact of Y ’ s injury is not sufficient for saying that 
D is responsible for bringing about Y ’ s  injury; D cannot be said to be 
responsible for Y ’ s  injury if the action of D that caused Y ’ s  injury is one with 
respect to which Y ’ s  injury was an unforeseeable consequence. These 
propositions, put together, yield the conclusion that it is unfair to impose 
liability on D for Y ’ s  injury if that injury was merely an unforeseeable 
consequence of D’s action.269 
Whatever its appropriateness in earlier times, this interpersonal vision 
seems out of focus in the climate change context, where Y may be a many 
thousand year old Inuit tribe and where D may be a multinational 
corporation that ranks above most nations as one of the largest economic 
entities in the world.270 Duty and foreseeability in this context should not be 
uncritically carried over from a nineteenth century template. Responsibility 
may need to be created, not limited. 
One attractive option will be to focus on the instrumental efficacy of 
large institutional actors, such as corporations, or groups of actors, such as 
industries. Notwithstanding isolated flirtation by judges with a concept of 
industry-wide “enterprise liability,”271 the basic account of agency in tort law 
remains essentially individualistic. Nevertheless, climate change litigation 
may cause courts to renew their romance with supra-individual conceptions 
of agency and responsibility, as the mismatch between the atomistic account 
and our governance needs will become starkly apparent. Even in the far less 
extreme causation context presented by Barasich, the court bridled against 
plaintiffs’ “allegations that all of the defendants’ activities caused all of the 
plaintiffs’ damages.”272 Rejecting any notion of “group liability” that would 
allow plaintiffs to recover “without demonstrating any individual connection 
between any single member of the industry and the plaintiffs’ harm,” the 
court ruled instead that traditional (and insurmountable) causal 
requirements apply.273 Again, a classical liberal individualism was at work, 
one in which “groups” do not easily register as duty-bearing entities with 
causal capacity, just as individuals are not thought to owe obligations to 
society at large. After marinating in climate change litigation for a while, 
however, judges might view a case like Barasich differently. They might see 
for instance, that the named defendants in Barasich had behaved as a group 
in several conspicuous ways, including collectively lobbying to secure rights 
 
in the element of duty, corresponds to the behavioral assumption that potential injurers, like 
drivers, need to focus and prioritize their precautionary efforts, something that would be 
difficult to accomplish under a generic, nonrelational conception of negligence.”). 
 269 Zipursky, supra note 146, at 1267. 
 270 D in this example is ExxonMobil Corp, the lead named defendant in Kivalina. For data 
supporting this characterization, see Rhett A. Butler, Corporations Agree to Cut Carbon 
Emissions, MONGOBAY.COM, Feb. 20, 2006, http://news.mongabay.com/2007/0220- 
roundtable.html (last visited Feb 13, 2011). 
 271 E.g., Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 358 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
 272 Barasich, 467 F. Supp. 2d 676, 694 (E.D. La. 2006). 
 273 Id. at 695. 
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to conduct the exploration and pipeline activities that allegedly caused 
plaintiffs harm.274  
Courts in the twenty-first century may also become increasingly 
sophisticated in their treatment of epistemic responsibility. Commentators 
frequently assume that causal pathways in the climate change context are 
too complex and speculative to ground a duty of tort responsibility under 
conventional approaches.275 This may or may not be true,276 but it is certainly 
mistaken to assume that foreseeability somehow exists independent of 
defendants and should be analyzed as such. To ask what is foreseeable in 
order to ground responsibility is to ignore the responsibility of those who 
influence what is foreseeable. In fact, as the Kivalina plaintiffs note in their 
complaint, major oil companies began funding research into the climate 
change problem as far back as 1970,277 right around the time that the first 
report of the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality warned that “carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere could have dramatic and long-term effects on 
world climate.”278 At a certain level of generality, then, foreseeability in the 
climate change context has been satisfied for decades. Following those early 
investigations, however, major oil companies shifted to a concerted effort to 
obfuscate public understanding of climate change and to forestall domestic 
and international legal action to arrest greenhouse gas emissions.279 
Accordingly, part of the reason that commentators today believe science 
cannot trace climate change’s causal pathways is that defendants have 
invested in the production of scientific doubt.280 Contrary to the classical 
view, then, it may not be unfair to hold defendants responsible for an 
unforeseeable harm when the attention and reach of foresight is itself 
increasingly under their influence. 
Tort law eventually will have to reckon with this dynamic, as it will 
become impossible to maintain the assumption that a robust independent 
body of knowledge exists to bring to bear on foreseeability questions. 
Moreover, as David Owen has written, twenty-first century problems are 
 
 274 E.g., Leslie Wayne, Companies Used to Getting Their Way, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1998, at C8 
(“‘The oil companies lobby in a very coordinated way,’ said a staff member for a House energy-
related committee.”). 
 275 E.g., Posner & Sunstein, supra note 247, at 1592. 
 276 See supra text accompanying note 246. 
 277 Complaint for Damages at and Demand for Jury Trial ¶ 162, Native Vill. of Kivalina, 663 F. 
Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. C 08-01138 SBA).  
 278 Id. at 34. (quoting COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 71, 90 (1970)). The Council on Environmental Quality has 
made all of its annual reports available online in a “Proactive Disclosure Reading Room.” See 
Council on Envtl. Quality, CEQ Proactive Disclosure Reading Room, http://www.whitehouse. 
gov/administration/eop/ceq/foia/readingroom (last visited Feb. 13, 2011). 
 279 JAMES HOGGAN & RICHARD LITTLEMORE, CLIMATE COVER UP: THE CRUSADE TO DENY GLOBAL 
WARMING (2009); ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 80, at 85–86, 190–97; ERIC POOLEY, THE CLIMATE 
WAR: TRUE BELIEVERS, POWER BROKERS, AND THE FIGHT TO SAVE THE EARTH 33–41 (2010). 
 280 John H. Cushman, Jr., Industrial Group Plans to Battle Climate Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
26, 1998, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/04/26/us/industrial-group-plans-to-
battle-climate-treaty.html. 
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likely to be ones characterized by predictable unforseeability.281 Increasingly, 
scientists are confident that we have entered a new geological epoch, the 
Anthropocene, in light of the sheer scale and intensity of human 
interventions into earth system processes.282 To name just one among many 
unprecedented features of this age, atmospheric CO2 levels are now higher 
than at any point in the last 650,000 years.283 Thus, it is reasonably 
foreseeable that we will face unforeseeable environmental challenges. 
Likewise, for precisely the same reason that they seem to hold enormous 
promise, new technologies such as genetic and nanoscale engineering also 
pose dimly understood and potentially considerable threats to human and 
ecosystem health.284 Behaving reasonably under such circumstances cannot 
simply mean conforming to an existing understanding of risk and benefit. 
Instead, it must mean relating to uncertainty in a particular way, with a 
particular attitude. It might mean, for instance, deploying what Sheila 
Jasanoff calls “technologies of humility”285 or what Buzz Thompson refers to 
as “exploration capacity.”286 Scenario planning and other proactive, open-
ended risk projection techniques might be required in order to behave 
reasonably toward novel technologies and activities, since their release 
constitutes a nonreplicable experiment on the world.287 Rather than risk 
 
 281 See Owen, supra note 196, at 580. 
 282 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE STABILIZATION TARGETS: EMISSIONS, CONCENTRATIONS, 
AND IMPACTS OVER DECADES TO MILLENNIA 2 (2010), available at http://www.nap.edu/ 
catalog.php?record_id=12877. 
 283 See id. at 1 (“Emissions of carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels have ushered in 
a new epoch where human activities will largely determine the evolution of Earth’s climate.”); 
see also Johan Rockström et al., A Safe Operating Space for Humanity, 461 NATURE 472, 472 
(2009) (listing, among global environmental stressors nearing estimated “planetary boundaries,” 
climate change, biodiversity loss, nitrogen and phosphorous cycle alterations, ozone depletion, 
freshwater depletion, land use alteration, atmospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution); 
Ruhl, supra note 6, at 394 (“[E]cologists now warn of the no-analog future—ecological 
variability unprecedented in the history of ecology, riddled with nonlinear feedback and 
feedforward loops, previously unknown emergent properties, and new thresholds of 
irreversible change.”). 
 284 See Owen, supra note 196, at 579, 607–08. 
 285 Sheila Jasanoff, Technologies of Humility, 450 NATURE 33, 33 (2007); Sheila Jasanoff, 
Technologies of Humility: Citizen Participation in Governing Science, 41 MINERVA 223, 227 (2004).  
 286 Personal communication from Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Robert E. Paradise Professor in 
Natural Resources Law and Perry L. McCarty Director, Woods Institute for the Environment, 
Stanford University (August 2009). 
 287 John Witt has written that these twenty-first century risks exceed the grasp of the 
tort system: 
Diverse new risks, including nuclear disasters, global warming, genetically modified 
organisms, and any number of complex systems whose compromise might lead to 
catastrophic results, present challenges on a scale that seems to defy even the most 
innovative accident-law institutions on the contemporary scene. Because we lack 
aggregatable experience with such catastrophes, these new catastrophic risks move 
beyond the actuarial model that emerged in the work-accident experience. Statistical 
models of risk like those that animated developments in the law of accidents a century 
ago simply cannot be assembled in the absence of the requisite time-series data. In this 
regard, the federal compensation fund set up in the wake of the September 11, 2001 
attack on the World Trade Center may be a harbinger of the kinds of departures from 
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deterring the production of knowledge about risky products and activities 
through fixed assumptions about foreseeability, tort law might instead actively 
marshal the considerable epistemic capacity of private enterprise by imposing 
more dynamic duties of humility, caution, and investigation. In the extreme, 
judges might reconsider their abandonment of the “constructive knowledge” 
approach to foreseeable risk.288 
B. Breach 
We are all embedded in systems in which responsibility is diffused to 
the vanishing point. As a result, the most consequential instances of 
negligence today are quite literally in the air, beyond the vision of the “eye of 
ordinary vigilance.” Once, extra-ordinary vigilance was a familiar feature of 
tort law, imposed as a duty on innkeepers, common carriers, promoters of 
ultrahazardous activities, and other designated status holders.289 The 
common law’s move toward a general duty of ordinary care, motivated 
largely by instrumentalist rather than classical convictions, has ironically 
obscured the instrumental benefits of a renewed focus on status, particularly 
the status of institutional actors: plaintiffs look to electric utilities and other 
choking points in the anthropogenic carbon cycle not necessarily because 
those actors are especially morally culpable, but because they are powerful 
entities created by law and capable of exerting strong influence over the 
systems in which we are embedded. If we think of fossil fuel companies as 
natural persons, we become embroiled in intractable disputes about whether 
and when they knew of climate change, how seriously they have 
manipulated public understanding and the political process, and so on. If we 
simply think of them as malleable creations of law, then we sidestep such 
questions and focus instead on how they might be deployed for public 
purposes. This does not mean, as some have opined, that corrective justice 
and other nonwelfarist considerations have no bearing on corporate 
responsibility.290 It does mean that instrumental considerations loom larger 
for the most instrumentally consequential actors within complex networks. 
 
traditional practice that we may be compelled to adopt in a world of mass risks and 
postmodern technologies. 
WITT, supra note 7, at 208–09 (footnote omitted). One claim of this Article, though, is that 
judges, and indeed all governmental actors, will be forced by the climate change problem to 
become comfortable with nonstandard risk assessment techniques. Id. at 209. As a result, 
common law judges may see the virtue of including such techniques within the judicial 
construction of reasonable foresight.  
 288 See supra text accompanying notes 197–98. 
 289 See generally, Robert W. James, Comment, Absolute Liability for Ultrahazardous 
Activities: An Appraisal of the Restatement Doctrine, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 269, 269–70 (1949) 
(discussing the idea of absolute liability as applied to defendants engaged in abnormally 
dangerous activities and other scenarios).  
 290 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 247, at 1595 (“[B]ecause the corporate form itself is a 
fiction, and the shareholders today are different from the wrongdoers yesterday, corporate 
liability cannot be grounded in corrective justice. Thus, it provides no analogy on behalf of 
corrective justice for the climate change debate.” (footnote omitted)). 
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Such an orientation has implications for the assessment of liability. For 
instance, one effect might be to reveal an even deeper wisdom behind Judge 
Learned Hand’s famous admonition in The T.J. Hooper v. Northern Barge 
Corporation,291 that “a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption 
of new and available devices.”292 This statement is often understood as an 
acknowledgment that markets sometimes fail and that independent judicial 
assessment of reasonableness is therefore merited, rather than deference to 
prevailing market conditions through a customary care standard.293 As the 
climate change problem reveals, independent judicial assessment of market 
outcomes may be merited not only by the kind of discrete market failures 
that justify partial equilibrium analysis, but also by pervasive structural 
features of the economy that no longer are sustainable, even if they might 
not as yet fail a partial equilibrium analysis. Judges will not become 
macroeconomists or energy systems analysts, of course, but as the broad 
features of the climate change problem are grasped by judges, they may 
experience a macro-scale shift in their attitude toward conventional 
economic activities. Judicial interest in strict liability—episodic and 
marginal in the past294—may revive as the accumulated negative externalities 
of greenhouse gas emissions come to loom far larger than the felt positive 
externalities of economic activity. 
In truth, attitudes of that sort have long driven tort doctrine, although 
typically in favor of negligence rather than strict liability.295 Even during tort 
law’s classical phases, judges struggled to explain why faultless victims of 
nonnegligent harms should bear a loss, rather than the actor who caused the 
harm.296 Appeals to defendants’ liberty interests and the value of freedom of 
action always rang hollow, given the obvious impairment of those same 
interests among injured plaintiffs.297 Pressed for an account, judges and 
commentators turned to a nebulous concept of social good that was said to 
flow from industrious activity.298 Often, such appeals took the form of rather 
histrionic claims about the “barbarism” and “savage life in a wilderness” that 
apparently would follow if individuals were not free to pursue their activities 
 
 291 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932). 
 292 Id. at 740 (holding that evidence of industry custom is relevant, but not decisive, for 
purposes of assessing reasonableness in the negligence context). 
 293 See Kenneth S. Abraham, Custom, Noncustomary Practice, and Negligence, 109 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1784, 1796–97 (2009); Joseph W. Rand, What Would Learned Hand Do?: Adapting to 
Technological Change and Protecting The Attorney-Client Privilege on the Internet, 66 BROOK. 
L. REV. 361, 364–65 (2000). 
 294 See James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. REV. 377, 
382–85 (2002). 
 295 The argument in this section is fully laid out in an article with Jon Hanson. See Hanson & 
Kysar, supra note 225.  
 296 WITT, supra note 7, at 47 (“[T]hose who articulated classical tort law faced an ongoing 
problem in elaborating the principles of a liberal approach to accidents for cases of 
nonnegligent harm to faultless victims.”).  
 297 That does not stop commentators from continuing to offer such appeals. See Peter M. 
Gerhart, The Death of Strict Liability, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 245, 264, 273 (2008). 
 298 See Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 484–85 (1873) (asserting that industrialization is 
necessary for civilization and the advancement of mankind). 
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without fear of strict liability.299 Although overt references to the ideologies 
of colonialism and Manifest Destiny eventually fell away, the core rationale 
for preferring negligence over strict liability remained one of a basic, almost 
aesthetic preference for society’s doers. As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. most 
famously put it:  
A man need not, it is true, do this or that act,—the term act implies a 
choice,—but he must act somehow. Furthermore, the public generally profits 
by individual activity. As action cannot be avoided, and tends to the public 
good, there is obviously no policy in throwing the hazard of what is at once 
desirable and inevitable upon the actor.300 
Classical tort law’s preference for the doer later was formalized by law 
and economics, as the choice between strict liability and negligence came to 
be seen as a matter of summing the negative and positive externalities 
generated by a defendant’s activity. According to canonical accounts, the 
costs and benefits of accidents are a function of two key variables: care 
levels and activity levels.301 The former has to do with the level of precaution 
an actor utilizes while engaging in an activity, while the latter has to do with 
the frequency and scale of the activity.302 With respect to any accident, then, 
judges may ask both whether the actor adopted all cost-justified investments 
in precaution and whether the activity in its overall costs and benefits was 
justified at all. The latter activity level analysis is said to be difficult, if not 
impossible for courts to conduct. Undertaking a macro-scale assessment of 
the costs and benefits of an activity requires tremendous amounts of 
information. It also invites judges to make critical assessments not merely of 
the marginal costs and benefits of some added safety step, such as driving 
within the speed limit, but of the more personal and subjective benefits of 
the activity itself. Judges would be forced to ask not only whether one drove 
carefully, but why one was driving at all: Was it to take Grandma to church 
on Sunday? Was it to visit her in the hospital? Or was the actor just “out for a 
drive,” as people used to say? 
On the law and economics account, such judgments are thought to be 
too costly and controversial for judges to undertake. Thus, the determinative 
factor in choosing between strict liability and negligence is said to hinge on 
these uncounted impacts of activity.303 Where judges suspect that an activity 
 
 299 Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442, 1873 WL 4192, at *6 (1873); see also Losee, 51 N.Y. at 
484–85 (“We must have factories, machinery, dams, canals and railroads. They are demanded 
by the manifold wants of mankind, and lay at the basis of all our civilization. If I have any of 
these upon my lands, and they are not a nuisance and are not so managed as to become such, I 
am not responsible for any damage they accidentally and unavoidably do my neighbor. He 
receives his compensation for such damage by the general good, in which he shares, and the 
right which he has to place the same things upon his lands.”). 
 300 OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 95 (Dover Publications 1991) (1881). 
 301 See Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17 (1980). 
 302 Keith N. Hylton, The Economic Theory of Nuisance Law and Implications for 
Environmental Regulation, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 673, 677 (2008). 
 303 Id. at 681. 
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poses significant residual costs even after all reasonable precautions have 
been undertaken, strict liability is justified.304 Implicitly, then, the canonical 
law and economics wisdom assumes that activities tend to offer positive 
benefits for society, over and above those which are already captured by the 
price mechanism.305 Absent such an assumption, it would remain 
unexplained why negligence is the default rule that must be overcome 
through a showing of significant unregulated costs from activity. Courts just 
as easily could apply strict liability as the default rule unless an activity is 
shown to offer significant uncaptured benefits.306 Thus, the classical liberal 
preference for the doer remains at work, albeit with more elaborate 
theoretical trappings. The dominance of the negligence standard for 
unintentional harms, and the gradual migration of trespass and nuisance 
liability away from strict standards of responsibility, is justified on the 
ground that activity levels are generally not thought to need disciplining, 
since positive externalities of activity tend to dominate negative ones.307 
Because of climate change, the presumption that external costs and 
benefits of activity are positive on net is becoming no longer tenable with 
respect to major segments of the economy. Although economic studies of 
climate change still tend to recommend fairly tepid policy responses,308 the 
tenor of the debate is starting to change even within economics, as 
thoughtful scholars are realizing that the field’s prior treatment of such 
issues as discounting, uncertainty, catastrophic risk, global equity, and 
adaptive capacity had drastically understated the severity of the climate 
change problem.309 Moreover, with respect to the choice between strict 
liability and negligence, the insight of law and economics is to focus 
specifically on externalized costs and benefits, rather than on those costs 
and benefits which are already incorporated into an actor’s private 
decisionmaking. In the absence of corrective legal interventions, actors have 
every reason to seek to capture gains from external benefits and every 
reason to avoid responsibility for external costs. In light of these lopsided 
incentives, one would naturally expect the external costs and benefits of 
greenhouse gas emissions to reflect a negative balance. Thus, the 
 
 304 Id. at 683. 
 305 See id. at 679. 
 306 With characteristic brilliance, Guido Calabresi long ago presaged not only the law and 
economics approach to activity level effects, but also its critique in just this fashion. See Guido 
Calabresi & John T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1063 
n.29 (1972). 
 307 See generally Jackson W. Adams, Cow 54, Where are You? Producer Liability and the 
National Animal Identification System, 23 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 106, 128–30 (2006) 
(explaining that American courts adopted negligence as the standard for unintentional harms to 
promote industry and its social benefits); Hylton, supra note 302, at 681 (arguing that adopting 
strict liability where external benefits are greater than social costs is not optimal); Frona M. 
Powell, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Evolution of Common Law in Modern Pollution Cases, 22 
REAL EST. L.J. 182, 187 (1992) (describing the move away from strict liability in trespass and 
nuisance actions).  
 308 See Lisa Heinzerling & Frank Ackerman, Law and Economics for a Warming World, 1 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 331, 344–46 (2007). 
 309 See supra text accompanying note 95; see infra text accompanying notes 368, 370. 
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longstanding assumption that “the public generally profits from individual 
activity” may be subjected to intense scrutiny in coming years, as the 
accumulated debts from such activity become increasingly difficult to 
ignore. At that point, the theoretical apparatus devised by law and 
economics to explain the dominance of negligence liability will instead 
provide strict liability’s most powerful justification.  
C. Causation 
Classical tort is most comfortable with liability when A is shown to 
have directly and exclusively caused a discrete harm to B. Advocates of this 
approach seek epistemic assurance that a tort defendant is the cause of 
plaintiff’s injury in order to implement “conceptions of individual 
responsibility that coincide neatly with eighteenth century science’s notions 
of causation.”310 Our understanding of many harms in the twenty-first century 
bears little resemblance to this atomistic and mechanistic worldview. An 
adverse outcome may be only probabilistically related to a prior action, 
given the inability of aggregative knowledge schemes to disaggregate causal 
influence in specific cases. The outcome may be the result of not one action 
or series of actions by a single actor, but rather a confluence of multiple 
actions by multiple actors, given the ability of complex, adaptive systems to 
combine and magnify causal impacts. Climate change renders this new 
worldview both plain and urgent, as billions of emitters now contribute to 
trend elevations that are difficult to dissect in an individual case, but that 
may ultimately lead to catastrophic tipping points. With respect to such “fat 
tail” risks, scientists are confident that they will occur if emissions continue 
unabated,311 but the ability to pinpoint time scales and risk factors is 
hampered by the lack of a spare planet on which to experiment.  
How should judges adapt to this new worldview? Consider two 
quotations from Judge Richard Posner: “[T]he courtroom is not the place for 
scientific guesswork, even of the inspired sort. Law lags science; it does not 
lead it.”;312 “Knowledge increasingly is statistical, and judges must not let 
themselves lag too far behind the progress of knowledge.”313 
Both quotations posit a lag between science and the courtroom, but the 
latter evinces an obligation on judges to keep up. For some time during the 
latter half of the twentieth century, judges did attempt to keep up, 
implementing new methods of dealing with scientific and statistical evidence 
of harm. Market share liability was devised as a way of apportioning 
responsibility for harm in the absence of other means to disaggregate causal 
influence. Loss of chance recovery was made available to those whose dim 
chances for survival might otherwise have rendered them ineligible for 
protection from negligent behavior under a more-likely-than-not causation 
 
 310 Brennan, supra note 145, at 491. 
 311 See Zickfeld, supra note 253, at 12,451, 12,453 fig.2. 
 312 Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.). 
 313 DePass v. United States, 721 F.2d 203, 209 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
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test.314 Subtle toxic causation presumptions were incorporated into contexts 
where orthodox doctrines would otherwise have prevented recovery due to 
uncertainty regarding the precise biological mechanism of a disease.315 At 
some point, however, these various developments were stopped short: 
market share liability was largely limited to the DES context,316 loss of 
chance recovery to the medical malpractice context,317 and novel toxicity 
presumptions to the asbestos context.318 
These limitations are difficult to understand from an internal 
perspective on tort law. As commentators have noted, the instrumental and 
fairness argument in favor of market share liability need not be limited to the 
kind of generic physical fungibility posed by DES.319 Other conceptions of 
fungibility—such as the generic lack of knowledge of any risk of HIV-AIDS 
among blood and plasma suppliers prior to the Center for Disease Control’s 
warning in 1983320—could just as easily support the market share theory. 
Likewise, the loss of chance doctrine, at bottom, rests on judicial recognition 
that certain increased risks can be sufficiently well-characterized to constitute 
a harm, and that certain actors should be made liable for such harms when 
they stand in relations of heightened responsibility vis-à-vis their charges, even 
if the percentage change in plaintiffs’ outlook does not clear a more-likely-
than-not hurdle. These reasons need not be limited to the medical 
malpractice context; industrial employers, for instance, could also be said to 
fit the identified conditions to the extent that tort law is not displaced by 
workers compensation schemes. More generally, increasing sophistication in 
the scientific understanding of risk counsels a shift from classical to 
probabilistic causation principles as a guiding template for analysis. Rather 
 
 314 See, e.g., Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 828 & n.23 (Mass. 2008) (observing 
that “[t]he highest courts of at least twenty States and the District of Columbia have adopted the 
loss of chance doctrine” and joining them). 
 315 See Stapleton, supra note 144, at 1025.  
 316 See Schwartz, supra note 75, at 671. One important exception is the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court’s decision to allow its variation of market share liability—the “risk-contribution theory”—
to be applied in the lead paint context. See Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523, 
567 (Wis. 2005). 
 317 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 cmt. n 
(2010) (“To date, the courts that have accepted lost opportunity as cognizable harm have almost 
universally limited its recognition to medical-malpractice cases.”). 
 318 On the exceptionalism of asbestos litigation, see Anita Bernstein, Asbestos 
Achievements, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 691, 709 (2008). 
 319 See, e.g., Glen O. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES 
Cases, 68 VA. L. REV. 713, 750 (1982) (“As long as liability is proportionate to the risks created 
by a defendant, there is no reason why the Sindell liability rule cannot be applied to cases 
involving multiple and different risk-creating activities.”); Allen Rostron, Beyond Market 
Share Liability: A Theory of Proportional Share Liability for Nonfungible Products, 52 UCLA 
L. REV. 151, 215 (2004) (arguing that courts should recognize that “fungibility is not essential 
if liability can be allocated in a way that reasonably accounts for the differing levels of risk 
created by each defendant”). 
 320 But see Doe v. Cutter Biological, 852 F. Supp. 909, 913, 924 (D. Idaho 1994) (declining to 
adopt market share or any other alternative causation doctrine to aid plaintiff hemophiliacs 
who had contracted HIV from infusion of tainted Factor VIII clotting agent), appeal dismissed, 
89 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 1996) (dismissed upon death of plaintiff). 
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than but-for causation, courts might take what Guido Calabresi calls “causal 
linkage” as the basic touchstone for analysis.321 At the least, such a 
conception might be accepted in the public nuisance context when 
governmental plaintiffs allege an elevated risk of harm over a time series of 
events or within a population of individuals or resources. More ambitiously, 
courts might fashion a system of proportionate recovery by individuals for 
mere risk exposure, as commentators have long advocated.322 
Ironically, the expressed desire of major greenhouse gas emitters to 
pursue a “Scopes monkey trial of the 21st century” may hasten these 
developments. Following the Supreme Court’s influential opinion in Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,323 all federal and most state courts 
have adopted a more proactive stance toward the admission and supervision 
of scientific evidence.324 In theory, the Daubert process need not entail a 
particular valence in favor of plaintiffs or defendants in the tort law context, 
since the espoused goal of the Court’s opinion was to move judges away 
from a simple scientific acceptance test to a more judicially-engaged 
inspection of the actual techniques and methodological rigor behind 
proffered scientific evidence. In practice, commentators regard Daubert as 
having created a heightened bar for plaintiffs in environmental, toxic tort, 
and products liability suits, as judges have shown a willingness to utilize 
their gatekeeper role to hold plaintiffs’ experts to a high standard of 
scientific veracity.325 Climate change litigation, however, may reverse this 
dynamic, particularly if defendants do choose to contest basic features of 
climate science. If judges are faced with climate change scientists and their 
skeptical counterparts in a series of intensive Daubert hearings, they will 
find the former group more worthy of admission to testify on every 
relevant criteria identified in Daubert and subsequent case law.326 Judicial 
concern about “junk science”—usually focused on experts hired by 
plaintiffs’ lawyers in advance of litigation—instead may shift to scientists 
 
 321 See Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, 
Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 71 & n.4 (1975) (“There is a causal link between an act or activity and 
an injury when we conclude on the basis of the available evidence that the recurrence of that 
act or activity will increase the chances that the injury will also occur.”). 
 322 See Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-in-Fact Rules for 
Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CAL. L. REV. 881, 895, 908 (1982); Glen O. Robinson, Probabilistic 
Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779, 781, 783 (1985); 
Robinson, supra note 319, at 739, 754; David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass 
Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 866, 928 (1984). 
 323 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 324 See Robert J. Goodwin, Fifty Years of Frye in Alabama: The Continuing Debate over 
Adopting the Test Established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 35 CUMB. L. 
REV. 231, 233–34 (2004–2005). 
 325 See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting the Balance Between Adverse Interests: The 
Impact of the Supreme Court’s Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation, 64 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring/Summer 2001, at 289, 290 (noting judges are less likely to admit some 
types of expert testimony under Daubert, allowing defendants an advantage in toxic tort cases).  
 326 See, e.g., Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 
310–33 (D. Vt. 2007) (thoroughly reviewing and finding qualified to testify leading climate 
change scientists, including Dr. James Hansen). 
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and spokespeople hired by greenhouse gas emitters.327 The result may be a 
cultural shift among judges in their attitudes toward scientific evidence 
and a concomitant willingness to re-engage their earlier efforts to 
modernize causation doctrine. 
D. Harm 
As feminist torts scholars have demonstrated, implicit conceptual 
dichotomies often lurk beneath the surface of tort doctrine: physical is 
contrasted with emotional, individual with communal, manmade with 
natural, immediate with distant, present with future, and so on.328 With 
varying degrees of subtlety, one side of these pairings is privileged over 
another, often on the theory that tort cannot provide redress for all wrongs 
and thus must establish some system of triage.329 More insidiously, the 
pairings become implicitly gendered, such that one side is viewed as 
prototypically male and the other female.330 The hierarchy of interests then 
inadvertently becomes a hierarchy of gender. These “deep structures of tort 
law”331 can exert a powerful and unnoticed impact on judicial 
decisionmaking. Disfiguration of sexualized female body parts, for instance, 
can lead judges to conclude that an emotional injury has been suffered.332 
Though obviously physical in a basic sense, the injury does not code as such 
because it inflicts harm on a body part that is otherwise coded as “female,” 
and therefore assumed to give rise to “emotional” suffering.333 Surfacing tort 
law’s deep structures and subjecting them to critique has been a major and 
fruitful focus of feminist tort scholarship for some time now. Intriguingly, 
climate change litigation may aid this cause by making more visible tort 
law’s disfavored interests. Certain forms of injury that have been 
rationalized away as incidental or marginal may come to appear more 
significant when presented in this dramatic new light. 
Consider the distinction between individual and communal interests, 
which relates to similar dichotomies between personal and relational or 
 
 327 See Sophia I. Gatowski, et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on 
Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 443 (2001) 
(noting that seventy five percent of surveyed judges believed that the Daubert ruling was 
intended to guard against “junk science”). Further results from this survey give reason for 
pause, it should be disclosed: While judges overwhelming support the active gatekeeper role 
established in Daubert and many overwhelmingly believe falsifiability and error rate to be 
crucial criteria to apply in that role, less than eight percent and four percent of judges, 
respectively, demonstrated basic understanding of what falsifiability and error rate actually 
mean in an open-response item. Id. at 444. 
 328 Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. 
REV. 463, 469 (1998). 
 329 Martha Chamallas, Vanished from the First Year: Lost Torts and Deep Structures in Tort 
Law, in LEGAL CANONS 104, 108 (J. M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson eds., 2000) 
 330 Chamallas, supra note 328, at 469. 
 331 Chamallas, supra note 329, at 107; Chamallas, supra note 328, at 467. 
 332 See Lucinda M. Finley, Female Trouble: The Implications of Tort Reform for Women, 64 
TENN. L. REV. 847, 860 (1997). 
 333 Id. at 858–59. 
GAL.KYSAR.DOC 3/10/2011  12:06 PM 
66 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 41:1 
property and cultural interests. In classical liberal fashion, the former set of 
interests is privileged over the latter within tort law, as evidenced by 
limitations on loss of consortium, bystander emotional distress, and other 
claims that express an inherently intersubjective harm. On broader social 
dimensions, judges struggle to comprehend what a claim for harm to 
cultural integrity might even mean. In the wake of the 1989 Exxon Valdez 
disaster, for instance, a class of Alaska Natives sought recovery for an 
irreparable impairment to their way of life, over and above the more tangible 
deprivations they had suffered.334 Addressing this claim, the Ninth Circuit 
first noted that the Alaska Native class had settled economic claims 
stemming directly from loss of fishing resources.335 The panel then pondered 
what could be meant by “cultural damage” apart from those losses.336 To the 
extent that culture was acknowledged by the panel, it was understood to be 
the basic right of every individual to pursue a life of his choosing in liberal 
society.337 From that perspective, the Alaska Natives failed to satisfy the 
“special injury” requirement that would enable them to recover as private 
litigants in the context of a public nuisance: “While the oil spill may have 
affected Alaska Natives more severely than other members of the public, the 
right to obtain and share wild food, enjoy uncontaminated nature, and 
cultivate traditional, cultural, spiritual, and psychological benefits in pristine 
natural surroundings is shared by all Alaskans.”338  
A sleight of hand was at work here. It may be that all Alaskans can 
pursue the various disaggregated activities that were impaired by the Exxon 
Valdez disaster and that collectively appear to compose the Native Alaskans’ 
distinctive culture. But only Native Alaskans can claim historical continuity 
with this culture. For all these thousands of years, it is only Native Alaskans 
who have been returning the bones of consumed salmon to the waters from 
which they are caught, with gratitude and hope for next year’s harvest.339 To 
imagine that liberalism’s self-made man might somehow fashion himself into 
the equivalent of a Native Alaskan is to deprive the group injury of 
distinctiveness through what amounts to a threat of cultural entry. And 
because liberalism promises to every individual maximal freedom to pursue 
his own life course, this hypothetical threat of entry is always available to 
defeat a claim of cultural distinctiveness.  
 
 334 Alaska Natives Class v. Exxon Corp., 104 F.3d 1196, 1197 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 335 Id. at 1198. 
 336 Id.  
 337 Id.  
 338 Id. (internal quotation omitted). Denise Antolini has criticized the special injury rule in 
the public nuisance context more generally, arguing that the modern requirement that 
plaintiffs demonstrate harm different in kind, rather than merely degree, from the public 
rests on a misconstrual of public nuisance’s historical origins. See Denise Antolini, supra 
note 118, at 761–63.  
 339 See Natural Res. Dep’t, The Tulalip Tribes, Tulalip Spring Chinook Run Boosts Cultural 
Pride, http://www.tulalip.nsn.us/htmldocs/nr062097.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2011). 
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As the number of lost cultures, languages, and territorial homelands 
mounts,340 judges will perhaps come to see group claims more charitably. 
Plaintiffs in the Kivalina litigation are also Native Alaskans, among the 
approximately 170,000 Inuit people that currently live in the Arctic.341 
Although their territory now belongs largely to the United States, Canada, 
Greenland, and Russia, the Inuit have lived in the Arctic for as long as 8000 
to 9000 years.342 To survive under such extreme conditions, the Inuit depend 
on accumulated knowledge about wildlife availability, weather patterns, and 
other ecological processes.343 With Arctic temperatures rising faster than 
anywhere else on the planet,344 much of the Inuit way of life is being 
challenged. For instance, traditional food sources such as caribou, moose, 
and waterfowl are shifting in range and declining in abundance.345 Important 
native plant species also are in decline.346 Traveling in search of food is 
becoming less predictable and more dangerous due to changing weather 
patterns, intensification of storms, thinning of sea and lake ice, and loss of 
snow for emergency shelter.347 As temperatures warm, traditional ways of 
drying fish and storing meat are becoming less safe and reliable.348 
Accordingly, the Inuit are shifting to canned goods and other Western foods 
in place of their traditional diet, with accompanying rises in diabetes and 
other diseases.349  
Already working against the effects of colonial and postcolonial 
attempts to eradicate indigenous culture,350 elders report increasing difficulty 
passing on traditional knowledge, as the veracity of that knowledge seems 
less obvious to younger generations.351 The longstanding Inuit practice of 
sharing the fruits of a hunt is also coming under strain.352 Developed as a way 
to spread the risk of low-probability, high-payoff hunts for whales and other 
large mammals, the sharing tradition also reinforces communal solidarity. 
But with some hunting grounds no longer viable due to sea ice loss and 
 
 340 See Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous People and Environmental Justice: The Impact of 
Climate Change, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1625, 1635 (2007) (summarizing threats posed by climate 
change to indigenous peoples). 
 341 These facts are drawn from a valuable University of British Columbia Faculty of Law 
teaching module. AVA MURPHY & SHI-LING HSU, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: INUIT V. THE U.S. 
ELECTRICITY GENERATION INDUSTRY 5 (2008), available at http://www.law.ubc.ca/files/pdf/enlaw/ 
climatechange_04_24_09.pdf. 
 342 Id. 
 343 Id. at 5–7.  
 344 Id. at 5 (citing INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: 
SYNTHESIS REPORT 30 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ 
ar4_syr.pdf).  
 345 Id. at 6. 
 346 Id. at 6–7. 
 347 Id. at 7. 
 348 Id.  
 349 Id. at 7, 9. 
 350 Brad Morse, Australia and Canada: Indigenous Peoples and the Law, 8 LEGAL SERVICE 
BULL. 104, 104–06 (1983).  
 351 MURPHY & HSU, supra note 341, at 9.  
 352 Id. 
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other changes, the stability of the hunting network system is under threat.353 
Higher levels of stress and anxiety also are reported, in large part because of 
a declining ability to express and enact the Inuit identity in its familiar 
form.354 Unfortunately, these trends will not reverse: given the existing stock 
of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the level of emissions expected 
under even the most optimistic mitigation scenario, and the special 
vulnerability of the Arctic to climate change impacts, the Inuit can expect an 
increasingly unfamiliar and inhospitable environment in the coming decades. 
Ironically, then, the reality of group-based cultural interests may become 
more tangible to courts precisely because their disappearance from the 
world makes their uniqueness and non-replicability more plain. Claims 
premised on climate change harms would still face a variety of other 
obstacles, but in a more tractable context like the Exxon Valdez litigation, 
courts may no longer assume that the cultural harm at issue is indistinct.  
A similar dynamic already seems to be playing out in the common law 
with respect to ecological resources. Although American property and tort 
law traditionally expressed a bias against intact wilderness and in favor of 
human development of land,355 some courts now are recognizing that a 
variety of valuable ecosystem services are derived from parcels of land that 
previously would have been coded as underexploited. “These ecosystem 
services include flood mitigation and groundwater recharge from wetlands, 
water filtration and sediment capture from forests, nutrient cycling, gas 
regulation, pollination, thermal regulation, carbon sequestration, and so 
on.”356 As Professor J.B. Ruhl has argued, advances in the scientific 
understanding and economic monetization of such services enable their 
recognition as protectable interests under traditional common law tests.357 
What once would have appeared as an exotic or speculative claim 
increasingly seems “rather plain vanilla as far as nuisance doctrine is 
concerned.”358 Thus, courts are beginning to adopt a sensibility toward land 
use that is more ecologically informed, breaking down the longstanding 
dichotomy between development, seen as productive, and wilderness, seen 
as wasteful or dangerous.  
The New Hampshire Supreme Court, for instance, has upheld a lower 
court order requiring relocation of a home that had been built on wetlands, 
thereby altering the area hydrology in a way that increased flooding on 
 
 353 Id. 
 354 Id. 
 355 See John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 519, 556 (1996). 
 356 J.B. Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecological, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 753, 757 (2008) 
(emphasis removed); see also Stephen M. Johnson, From Climate Change and Hurricanes to 
Ecological Nuisances: Common Law Remedies for Public Law Failures?, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1607861. 
 357 Ruhl, supra note 356, at 768, 773. 
 358 Id. at 773. 
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plaintiff’s land.359 Likewise, the Minnesota Supreme Court has upheld 
negligence liability against landowners whose pesticide spraying activities 
on their own land foreseeably harmed bees that were visiting to forage from 
a neighbor’s beekeeping operation.360 The Barasich litigation is also 
instructive in this regard, as plaintiffs successfully impressed upon the trial 
judge the seriousness of marshland erosion, even if they did not prevail in 
establishing a duty owed by defendants to protect the marshland’s 
ecological integrity.361 Climate change suits will further this exercise in 
judicial education, as the attempt to understand any climate change harm 
forces judges to think ecologically.362 Ecosystem services that were 
previously overlooked or undervalued become more legible and material. 
Distances that seemed remote become more intimate, as the natural 
pathways that connect them are brought into view. Accordingly, it 
becomes less comfortable to maintain the traditional assumptions that 
“natural” and “distant” interests are less important than those that are 
“manmade” and “immediate.” 
Less comfortable too will be the traditional assumption that risk of 
future harm is not itself an injury. In the asbestos context, such an 
assumption drove the Supreme Court to reject medical monitoring, fear-of-
exposure, and enhanced risk theories of tort recovery, out of concern that 
such harms are “comparatively less important” than realized harms.363 While 
state courts have shown some willingness to allow recovery for medical 
monitoring expenses on account of toxic substance exposure, they too have 
rejected the notion that enhanced risk is itself a compensable harm.364 Like 
the somewhat arbitrary restriction of loss of chance recovery to the medical 
malpractice context,365 courts have not adequately justified this stance. 
Concern over limited funds and the need to prioritize recovery is one 
attempt, but it is unsatisfactory. From a corrective justice orientation, it 
does seem problematic to allow recovery on account of enhanced risk if 
“comparatively more important” harms will later go uncompensated. From 
an instrumentalist orientation, however, the limited fund problem seems less 
 
 359 See John Copeland Nagle, From Swamp Drainage to Wetlands Regulation to Ecological 
Nuisances to Environmental Ethics, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 787, 799 (2008) (citing Cook v. 
Sullivan, 829 A.2d 1059, 1067–68 (N.H. 2003)). 
 360 Anderson v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 693 N.W.2d 181, 192 (Minn. 2005). For discussion 
of this case, see Alexandra B. Klass, Bees, Trees, Preemption, and Nuisance: A New Path to 
Resolving Pesticide Land Use Disputes, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 763, 803–05 (2005). 
 361 467 F. Supp. 2d 676, 678–79, 695 (E.D. La. 2006)  
 362 Relatedly, scholars have argued that climate change will force the common law public 
trust doctrine to become more broad and flexible in its conception of the public’s entitlement 
to ecological resources. See Craig, supra note 210, at 781; Mary Christina Wood, Advancing 
the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future 
Generations (Part I): Ecological Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift, 39 ENVTL. L. 43, 
63–64 (2009). 
 363 Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 432, 435–36, 444 (1997); see also 
Mark Geistfeld, supra note 266, at 1934, 1943. 
 364 See Schwartz, supra note 75, at 677 (observing that “absent . . . a current injury, most 
courts have been reluctant to approve recoveries for fear of future diseases”). 
 365 See supra text accompanying note 317. 
GAL.KYSAR.DOC 3/10/2011  12:06 PM 
70 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 41:1 
pressing since the incentive effects of enhanced risk recovery going forward 
would be to discourage activities that give rise to a limited fund problem in 
the first place. Because the ability to attract capital in furtherance of 
potentially harmful activities or products would be lessened, tort law would 
help channel economic activity toward softer development paths, while still 
maintaining the flexibility and decentralized decisionmaking for which 
markets are heralded. Governance would, in a sense, be distributed 
throughout the market by altering the constraints under which market 
actors optimize.366 
Short-sighted and optimistic habits of thought frequently lead us to 
downplay the significance of uncertain future harms in pursuit of current 
gains.367 The debt overhang from these bargains is beginning to appear 
worrisome to those who study it. Climate change litigation offers a useful de-
biasing opportunity because it focuses courts’ attention on the extraordinary 
inertia and risk potential of the climate system. Familiar linear 
understandings of time become confused in the climate change context, 
where emissions are long-lived and system patterns are often irreversible. 
The possibility of runaway climate change and other catastrophic scenarios 
focuses attention on the “fat tails” of the risk distribution, while the reality of 
system inertia—both in the climate system and in social systems such as 
energy or transportation infrastructure—forces those scenarios into present 
consideration. The decision to build a new coal-fired electricity plant, for 
instance, can no longer be evaluated according to the present discounted 
value of future mean risk estimates. Or, rather, it is no longer reasonable to 
evaluate the decision in that manner. Instead, the reality of path dependence 
in energy infrastructure investment and the possibility of climate change 
catastrophe demands more by way of prevention and insurance than it does 
optimal cost-benefit balancing.368 Likewise, the implementation of duties 
toward future generations demands consideration of the distribution of 
rights and resources across time, rather than the normalization of costs and 
benefits according to a discount rate. The intergenerational distribution 
gives rise to discount rates; it cannot be determined by them.369  
Once judges have understood these aspects of the climate change 
problem, they may view risk recovery as a useful epistemological device for 
bringing the future into present focus and attention. Again, climate change 
plaintiffs will face a variety of remaining doctrinal obstacles, but for other 
victims of future harm, courts may begin to see the wisdom of fashioning 
 
 366 See Douglas A. Kysar, Ecologic: Nanotechnology, Environmental Assurance Bonding, and 
Symmetric Humility, 28 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2010). 
 367 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 
299, 307–13 (2000). 
 368 On path dependence in technological and socioeconomic systems, see Steven J. Davis et 
al., Future CO2 Emissions and Climate Change from Existing Energy Infrastructure, 329 SCIENCE 
1330, 1333 (2010). On the significance of insurance-based reasoning to climate policy, see 
Martin L. Weitzman, On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate 
Change, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1 (2009), and Martin L. Weitzman, A Review of the Stern Review 
on the Economics of Climate Change, 45 J. ECON. LITERATURE 703 (2007). 
 369 See Douglas A. Kysar, Discounting . . . On Stilts, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 122–23 (2007). 
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mechanisms to overcome temporal neglect. By comparison to the climate 
change conundrum, the latency problem posed in more garden variety 
environmental and toxic tort suits seems quite manageable. As regulators 
grapple with the challenge of compounding centuries-spanning climate 
impacts into the price of carbon, courts may feel less timid using the liability 
system to bridge two or three decades in the case of toxic substances 
exposure. This may be especially likely if regulators find themselves 
increasingly unable to prioritize such risks for oversight, given the sheer 
magnitude and complexity of their other tasks. By adapting to these 
changes—both in the world of risk and in its regulation—common law 
judges would ensure the continued relevance and importance of tort law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding admirable scholarly attempts to encapsulate its 
intellectual essence, tort law does not exist in a vacuum as the pure 
unfolding of an internal logic. Nor does it inevitably and predictably respond 
to material conditions outside the courtroom. Nor finally does it have a 
monopoly on principles and procedures for redressing and preventing harm. 
Instead, ideas about the proper form and function of tort law must 
continually interact with the raw realities of human suffering and with 
various alternative institutions that address such suffering.370 Obviously, such 
a complex and contingent matrix does not lend itself readily to prediction, 
but if scientists are even remotely correct in their assessment of harms to be 
expected from greenhouse gas emissions, then climate change will enter 
prominently into tort law’s evolutionary dynamics. Accordingly, this Article 
has offered speculative discussion on what a barrage of climate change tort 
suits might do for the development of tort law itself. It has argued that 
judges likely will not award damages or issue injunctions for climate-related 
harms, but that they may find themselves affected in other ways by the very 
process of rejecting such claims. As a result, the tort system may shift to 
keep in alignment with an administrative state that is increasingly pre-
occupied by grander and more complicated challenges than the previous 
century posed.  
Even as climate change tort suits fail on the merits, they may yet 
change the air. 
 
 370 See Witt, supra note 75, at 19. 
